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MAKING PLAINTIFFS WHOLE: A TAX PROBLEM
OF INTEREST
WILLIAM E. FOSTER∗
Abstract
This article illustrates the dramatic tax impact of interest awards in
otherwise non-taxable litigation recoveries and proposes two alternative
legislative solutions for the over-taxing of plaintiffs in these cases. While
plaintiffs who recover personal injury awards typically receive favorable
tax treatment, those who receive interest on such awards are taxed on the
interest and often are not able to utilize deductions for attorney’s fees and
other costs paid to obtain the award. Further, the attorney’s portion of
the recovery in a contingency fee arrangement will be included in the
plaintiff’s gross income. The result is that the plaintiff recovers less of
the interest than the Treasury or her attorney, preventing the plaintiff
from truly being made whole. After reviewing the historical and
theoretical framework that produces these results, I suggest previously
proposed judicial solutions to the problem are impracticable and a
legislative solution is necessary. I conclude with a proposal for two
alternative legislative solutions: an expanded deduction and an exclusion
to provide relief for plaintiffs recovering partially taxable awards and to
achieve the policy of fully compensating injured plaintiffs.
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Introduction
Ever since the sinking of the Lusitania, taxpayers and courts have
struggled with the proper tax treatment of interest added to otherwise nontaxable litigation awards.1 Today, non-taxable compensatory awards and
settlement payments (such as for personal injury damages)2 are often
1. In Riddle v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1933), the taxpayer recovered, among
other amounts, $15,000.00 from the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and
Germany, as a result of personal injuries suffered during the sinking of the steamship
Lusitania in 1915. Id. at 1339-40. In addition to the personal injury damages, the taxpayer
received $3,422.61 of interest on the recovery. Id. at 1341. The personal injury damages
were excluded from gross income under section 22(a)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1928, but the
taxpayer and the Treasury disagreed about the taxability of the interest received. The Board
of Tax Appeals concluded that the interest award was indeed a separate item from the
excluded damages award, and was itself taxable absent a separate exclusion. Id. at 1340-41.
Perhaps ironically, it was the sinking of the Lusitania that accelerated the United States’
entry into World War I, the funding of which required the first significant expansion of the
applicability of the modern federal individual income tax. See generally ROBERT M.
WILLAN, INCOME TAXES CONCISE HISTORY AND PRIMER 9-13 (1993); David Frederick,
Historical Lessons from the Life and Death of the Federal Estate Tax, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
197, 205 (2007) (citing PAULINE MAIER ET AL., INVENTING AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 527, 719 (2003)).
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(2010) (“[G]ross income does not include . . . the
amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal
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coupled with taxable interest3 or punitive damages.4 These bifurcated
awards create a host of taxation issues, both theoretical and practical.
One of the most significant problems for recovering plaintiffs in
contingency cases is that they must pay the attorney’s fee based on the
entire taxable and non-taxable amount of the payment, but generally
enjoy a deduction only to the extent such fees relate to the taxable portion
of the award.5 Generally, there is no deduction for attorney’s fees or other
costs that relate to non-taxable awards.6 Additionally, even when such
attorney’s fees are deductible,7 the deductions are typically miscellaneous
itemized deductions (“MID”), limited to amounts exceeding two percent
of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (“AGI”).8 Of perhaps even
greater concern, the plaintiff’s alternative minimum tax (“AMT”)
liability, which would be triggered by any significant award or settlement,
must be computed without miscellaneous itemized deductions, including
the deduction for attorney’s fees that produce taxable income.9
physical injuries or physical sickness . . . .”).
3. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) includes “[i]nterest” in gross income of taxpayers.
4. See, e.g., McCann v. Comm’r, 87 F. App’x. 359, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2004) (involving
a settlement payment of $839,000, $400,000 of which was for excludable personal injury
damages and $439,000 of which was for taxable interest); Kovacs v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 124
(1993) (settlement after extensive appeal for $2,254,741.70, of which $995,000 was for taxfree wrongful death damages and $1,253,607.17 was for taxable interest).
5. I.R.C. § 212(1) provides a deduction for “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred . . . for the production or collection of income.”
6. “No deduction is allowable under section 212 for any amount allocable to the
production or collection of one or more classes of income which are not includible in gross
income, or for any amount allocable to the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income which is not included in gross income.” Treas.
Reg. § 1.212-1(e)(2010); see also I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) (“No deduction shall be allowed for . . .
[a]ny amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to one or more classes
of income . . . wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle.”).
7. For example, when such fees relate to recovering taxable awards, they can be
considered “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . for the production or
collection of income” for purposes of I.R.C. § 212(1).
8. “[M]iscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable year shall be allowed only to
the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross
income.” I.R.C. § 67(a). The deduction for attorney’s fees provided in I.R.C. § 212 is not
included in the list of deductions in I.R.C. § 67(b), which are excluded from the
miscellaneous itemized deductions category. For example, assuming a taxpayer had an AGI
of $100,000 and wanted to offset her income with a $2100 MID, two percent of the AGI, or
$2000, would be a wasted deduction and would not reduce her tax liability. Only the $100
of the MID that exceeds the $2000 threshold is potentially useable by the taxpayer to offset
her income.
9. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A).
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Congress has seemingly recognized these problems but has cherrypicked the contexts for redress. Specifically, Congress has provided
limited relief in the form of an above-the-line deduction for expenses
incurred in obtaining certain employment and civil rights recoveries,10 but
not in the more pervasive personal injury context. This gap in tax
treatment is normatively unjustified and under-theorized. This article
provides a much-needed analysis of the problem and proposes a
legislative solution.
One might well object to the inclusion of the attorney’s portion of an
award or settlement payment in the plaintiff’s gross income based on the
fact that the money never actually passes through the plaintiff’s hands.
That is, in most cases involving a contingency fee, the plaintiff’s attorney
is compensated directly by the defendant with the plaintiff never actually
possessing the attorney’s portion of the recovery.11 When coupled with
the fact that the underlying award or settlement payment may be excluded
from tax because it results from a personal injury or other harm that
Congress has determined should result in a tax-free recovery, the taxation
of the plaintiff on the interest and punitive damages portion of the
attorney’s fee is even more difficult to accept. Indeed, in many cases, had
the defendant’s actions not triggered liability for either interest or punitive
damages, then no portion of the plaintiff’s recovery, and thus no portion
of the amounts paid to the plaintiff’s attorney, would be taxable to the
plaintiff.
These are important concerns, but current doctrine seems to reject
them. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner v.
Banks,12 it is now clear that the plaintiff must include in her income
amounts paid to her attorney through contingent fee arrangements.13 With
such a potentially substantial tax liability lurking after payment, it is
imperative that all parties to a lawsuit and their respective attorneys and
advisors fully understand and communicate the tax consequences of such
10. I.R.C. § 62(a)(20) provides an “above the line” deduction (i.e., the items deducted
will not be included in adjusted gross income and will therefore not be subject to the two
percent floor of I.R.C. § 67) for “attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the
taxpayer in connection with any action involving a claim of unlawful discrimination [certain
claims against the U.S. government, and certain claims under the Social Security Act],” but
only to the extent such amounts are includible in the taxpayer’s gross income.
11. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 399, 405 (2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 881 (7th
Cir. 2001) (plaintiff received a $229,501.37 cash settlement, of which $91,800.54 was paid
directly to the plaintiff’s attorney).
12. 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
13. Id. at 430; see infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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payments in order to assess with accuracy settlement possibilities and
prudent management of any funds received.
Recent scholarship in the area has focused on alternate views of the
contingent fee arrangement and even the nature of the taxpayer’s asset
(i.e., the lawsuit).14 It has become apparent in the seven years since the
Banks decision, however, that a more pragmatic approach is necessary to
provide relief to taxpayers ensnared by the combination of inclusion of
the entire award in the plaintiff’s income and the limitations on the
deductibility of fees and costs when recoveries are obtained pursuant to
contingent fee arrangements.15 Additionally, previous academic treatment
has focused primarily on taxpayers that received entirely taxable awards.
This article, by contrast, attempts to bring to light the role of interest and
the significant deductibility and AMT limitations faced by taxpayers
recovering amounts that are partially non-taxable and partially taxable.
This article proposes expanding Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.” or
“Code”) §§ 62(a)(20) and 212 to provide an above-the-line deduction for
all fees and costs incurred in connection with any action involving a claim
having a recovery which is excluded from gross income under I.R.C. §
104(a) (i.e., personal injury or sickness recoveries) to the extent that such
claim results in a recovery that includes a taxable interest component.
Alternatively, the same relief could be accomplished through enactment
of a new exclusion in the amount of attorney’s fees (and perhaps other
costs) paid by a taxpayer in connection with any action involving a
personal injury or sickness claim, recovery of which is otherwise
excluded from gross income under Code § 104(a). Although the process
of revising the tax code itself can be challenging and fraught with political
contention,16 once a legislative solution is achieved, taxpayers and their
advisors will have a greater degree of certainty with respect to the
potential tax liability flowing from a settlement or award.
Part I of this article describes the problem presented by the inclusion in
the plaintiff’s income of the attorney’s portion of the recovery and the
historical background leading to such inclusion. Part II explains the
theoretical basis for the tax treatment of litigation interest, the challenges
facing plaintiffs and their advisors in allocating fees and costs associated
14. See infra Part II.
15. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
16. One need only look to the extension of the “Bush Tax Cuts” in December 2010 for
an example of how politically divisive tax reform can be. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn
& Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Defends Tax Deal, but His Party Stays Hostile, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/us/politics/08cong.html?_r=1.
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with partially taxable and partially non-taxable awards, and gives an
illustration of the dramatically different tax results that follow various
interest and deductibility scenarios. Part III reviews some of the
previously proposed solutions to the problem of inclusion of the
attorney’s fee in the plaintiff’s taxable income. Part IV suggests two
alternative legislative approaches — a deduction and an exclusion —
intended to address the unique tax issues presented to plaintiffs who
recover non-taxable awards with taxable components, and presents policy
arguments in favor of a legislative solution. This article concludes with a
call for action to adopt a legislative solution for the problems presented
here.
I. The Problem
A. Inclusion of Attorney’s Portion of the Award and AMT Issues
Certain recoveries are not taxable from the outset. For example, the
Internal Revenue Code specifically excludes from a successful litigant’s
gross income compensatory recoveries resulting from personal injuries.
Code § 104(a)(2) provides that “gross income does not include . . . the
amount of damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) . . .
on account of personal physical injuries or personal sickness[.]”17 On the
other hand, interest is taxable even if it arises out of and is computed on
an otherwise non-taxable award. Code § 61(a)(4) states that “gross
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but
not limited to) . . . interest.”18 Despite taxpayers’ initial assertions that
interest should be construed as part and parcel of the non-taxable recovery
from which it grew, the Treasury and the courts established the separate
nature of interest apart from the underlying compensatory recovery from
the early days of the modern federal individual income tax.19 Adhering to
this paradigm which separates interest from the underlying award requires
all recoveries that include an interest (or other taxable) component to be
analyzed on a piecemeal basis.
The reduction of the plaintiff’s recovery due to the taxability of the
interest portion of an otherwise non-taxable award is only the beginning
of the plaintiff’s burden. In personal injury cases, plaintiffs almost

17. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2010).
18. Id. § 61(a)(4).
19. See Riddle v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 1339, 1939-41 (1933).
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always retain attorneys pursuant to a contingency fee contract.20 This
arrangement allows plaintiffs access to the courts without much, if any,
upfront cost.21 The tradeoff is that the plaintiff must pay her attorney a
percentage of the ultimate recovery when received. This percentage may
range from twenty percent of the recovery if the claim is settled easily and
early to fifty percent or more if trial and appeal work are involved.22
Moreover, the contingent attorney’s fee is typically determined based on
the plaintiff’s entire recovery, including both the non-taxable personal
injury recovery and any interest received.23
The depletion of the plaintiff’s recovery could be mitigated somewhat
by an effective deduction for the fees incurred to procure the recovery. In
fact, Code § 212(1) provides a deduction for “ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred . . . for the production or collection of
income[.]”24 The plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and other costs paid to obtain
certain recoveries no doubt are “for the production or collection of
income.” The deduction of such amounts, however, is limited to the
extent they relate to only the taxable portion of the recovery.25 According
to the regulations, no § 212 deduction is allowed “for any amount
allocable to the production of one or more classes of income which are
not includible in gross income, or for any amount allocable to the
20. “Virtually all tort claiming is financed by plaintiff lawyers through the medium of
contingent fees.” Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 68 (2003). A 1989 report by
the Federal Trade Commission reported that 97% of injury cases were taken on a
contingency fee basis, regardless of generous offers for an hourly rate. WALTER K. OLSON,
THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 47 (1991).
21. See Sharon Reece, Lemonade from Lemons: The Solution to Taxation of the
Contingent Fee Portion of Damage Awards, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 305, 337 (2004).
22. Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees:
Their Impact on Settlements Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2164 n.37 (1992)
(“Typically, the contingency percentage is one third of all proceeds, although it reportedly
reaches 50% in some cases.”) (citing OLSON, supra note 20, at 47). While a common
practice is to have a constant percentage (typically one-third of the recovery), “some
attorneys vary the percentage depending on the stage of litigation, e.g., 30% of settlement
proceeds and 50% of trial judgment proceeds.” Id. (citing John J. Donohue, The Effects of
Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and
Contingency Fees, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 210 n.55).
23. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 124, 126 (1993) (plaintiff recovered
$2,254,741.70 of which $1,253,607.17 was interest and $749,535.72 was paid directly to the
attorney under a one-third contingency fee).
24. I.R.C. § 212(1) (2010).
25. Id. § 265(a)(2).
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management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income which is not included in gross income.”26 Further,
Code § 265(a)(2) provides that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed for . . .
[a]ny amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to one
or more classes of income . . . wholly exempt from taxes imposed by this
subtitle . . . .”27 This result was confirmed in Church v. Commissioner, in
which the Tax Court stated: “[t]o the extent [the attorney’s fees and
costs] are allocable to the interest portion of the award, however, they are
deductible under section 212(1) as an expense incurred for the production
of income. To the extent they are allocable to exempt income, they are
nondeductible under section 265(1).”28
Furthermore, the deductions that are allowed to a plaintiff for fees and
costs incurred to produce taxable income are severely limited, and in
many cases worthless. The § 212 deduction for the production or
collection of income is a miscellaneous itemized deduction, as it is not
referenced in Code § 67(b), which contains the list of itemized deductions
that are excluded from the miscellaneous itemized category.29 The
miscellaneous itemized deduction designation means that until such
amounts exceed two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, no
deduction is available.30
More drastically, the alternative minimum tax (“AMT”) requires
taxpayers to calculate their taxes on an alternative tax system without the
use of any miscellaneous itemized deductions, including the deduction for
attorney’s fees that produce taxable income.31 While originally enacted to
address perceived inequities attributable to the fact that some high-income
taxpayers paid almost nothing in taxes, the AMT now ensnares
individuals with a wide range of incomes.32 Taxpayers will be subject to
the AMT if the tax liability on their alternative minimum taxable income
(“AMTI”) is greater than the tax liability on their regular taxable
income.33 Individuals are subject to twenty-six percent (up to $175,000
for joint returns and $87,500 for single returns) or twenty-eight percent
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(e)(2010).
27. I.R.C. § 265(a)(2).
28. 80 T.C. 1104, 1110-11 (1983).
29. I.R.C. § 67(b).
30. Id. § 67(a). See supra note 8 for an example of the operation of the cap on
miscellaneous itemized deductions.
31. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A).
32. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 208-09 (11th ed. 2009).
33. I.R.C. § 55(a).
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(on amounts exceeding $175,000 for joint returns and $87,500 for single
returns) rates on the AMTI.34 For 2011, there were separate AMT
exemptions in the amount of $74,450 for married taxpayers filing jointly
and $48,450 for single individuals.35 These exemptions are subject to a
twenty-five percent phase-out, however, beginning when joint return
taxpayers’ AMTI exceeds $150,000 and when a single taxpayer’s AMTI
exceeds $112,500.36 The result is that the AMT exemption is effectively
eliminated for joint return taxpayers at AMTI of $447,80037 and for single
taxpayers at AMTI of $306,300.38 Accordingly, plaintiffs with even
relatively modest recoveries will be subject to the highest AMT rates and
will have no use of the miscellaneous itemized deduction for attorney’s
fees incurred to generate their recovery income.39 As such, the nondeductibility of fees and expenses related to non-taxable recoveries and
the severe limitations on deductibility of fees and expenses related to
taxable recoveries combine to form an extremely unfavorable tax
environment for plaintiffs recovering partially taxable and partially nontaxable awards.
B. Historical Background on Inclusion
Although it was only recently settled by the Supreme Court that a
taxpayer cannot exclude from income the recovered amounts paid directly
to the attorney through contingent fee arrangements, the development of
the issues in play hearkens back to seminal tax case law and well-worn
doctrine. The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Commissioner v. Banks40
resolved a split among the circuit courts of appeals41 by determining that
34. Id. § 55(b)(1)(A).
35. Id. § 55(d)(1). Because the AMT exemption is not automatically adjusted for
inflation, after 2011 these exemption amounts are scheduled to return to the statutory
$45,000 for joint returns and $33,750 for single individuals. Id.
36. Id. § 55(d)(3).
37. $74,450 x 4 + $150,000.
38. $48,450 x 4 + $112,500.
39. See generally Brant J. Hellwig & Gregg D. Polsky, Litigation Expenses and the
Alternative Minimum Tax, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 899 (2004); Ilir Mujalovic, Yet Another
Alternative Minimum Tax Disaster: How a Recovery of Damages Turns into a Liability, 47
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 355 (2003).
40. 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
41. The split divided the Second, Fourth, Seventh, some Ninth Circuit courts, and the
Federal Circuits (requiring inclusion of the plaintiff’s entire recovery in its gross income)
from the Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and other Ninth Circuit courts (allowing plaintiffs to reduce
gross income by amounts not actually received by the plaintiff). See Leah Witcher Jackson,
Won the Legal Battle, but at What Tax Cost to Your Client: Tax Consequences of
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even if a portion of the plaintiff’s taxable award is paid directly to his or
her attorney under a contingency fee arrangement, that amount is taxed to
the plaintiff.42 In sustaining the Commissioner’s objection to the
taxpayers’ exclusion of the portion of the award paid directly to the
taxpayers’ attorneys, the Court held that “[a]s a general rule, when a
litigant’s recovery constitutes income, the litigant’s income includes the
portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee.”43 The
Court relied heavily on the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine to
reach this conclusion in Banks, stating that it agreed with the
Commissioner’s position “that a contingent-fee arrangement should be
viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a portion of the
client’s income from any litigation recovery.”44 Accordingly, a brief
review of the origins of the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is
in order.
The assignment of income doctrine traces its roots to the venerable
Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Earl.45 In Earl, the taxpayer, Guy
Earl, and his wife entered into an agreement in 1901 that provided that all
property (including salaries, fees, etc.) then owned or thereafter acquired
by either spouse would be deemed held by both spouses as joint tenants
with rights of survivorship.46 This was intended simply to avoid probate
for a portion of their property, as no federal individual income tax was in
effect at the time of the 1901 agreement.47 Mr. Earl was a successful
attorney in California and a man of substantial means.48 By the time of
the final decision in 1930, the 1901 agreement would have given the Earls
a significant break from the progressive income tax rates, as both spouses
could have utilized lower marginal rates.49
In holding that,
notwithstanding the couple’s agreement, all income earned by Mr. Earl
was taxable to him alone, Justice Holmes set forth one of the most
recognizable tenets in all of tax law:
Contingency Fee Arrangements Leading up to and after Commissioner v. Banks, 57
BAYLOR L. REV. 47, 53 (2005).
42. Banks, 543 U.S. at 430.
43. Id. at 430.
44. Id. at 434.
45. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
46. Id. at 113-14; see also Patricia A. Cain, The Story of Earl: How Echoes (and
Metaphors) from the Past Continue to Shape the Assignment of Income Doctrine, in TAX
STORIES 305 (Paul A. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009).
47. WILLAN, supra note 1, at 4.
48. Cain, supra note 46, at 313-15.
49. Id. at 315.
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There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those
who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped
by anticipatory assignments . . . and we think that no
distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the
arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew.50
In other words, although the assignment of Mr. Earl’s future earnings
may have been an effective transfer under state law, it would not serve to
bifurcate his taxable income.51 Consequently, taxpayers and their
advisors have spent much of the last eighty-two years trying to ensure
their fruit does not wander to another’s tree.
Building on the pronouncement in Earl of the anticipatory assignment
of income doctrine in the context of income derived from services (i.e.,
Mr. Earl’s legal fees), the 1940 Supreme Court decision in Helvering v.
Horst52 applied the assignment of income doctrine to income derived from
property. In Horst, the taxpayer owned corporate bonds with detachable
interest coupons.53 The taxpayer detached several of the coupons prior to
maturity and gifted them to his son, in essence assigning away the interest
from the bonds while retaining the underlying bond instrument.54 When
the son cashed the coupons at maturity, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), and subsequently, the Supreme Court, determined that the father,
rather than the son, should be taxed on the interest.55 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court ruled that direction of disposition of the right to
receive interest while retaining ownership was equivalent to an exercise
of ownership over the interest itself.56 Accordingly, this transfer should
produce the same result as the father’s first receiving the income and then
transferring it to his son.
Earl and Horst laid a foundation for a rather expansive view of the
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, whether addressing income
derived from property or services. There may be no more liberal
interpretation of that doctrine than that employed in Commissioner v.
Banks.57 The Supreme Court’s Banks decision was a consolidation of two
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15.
Id. at 114.
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 114, 120.
Id. at 116-18.
543 U.S. 426 (2005).
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cases: Commissioner v. Banaitis,58 and Commissioner v. Banks.59 Both
cases involved underlying awards or settlements that were taxable at the
time of recovery.60 In Banaitis, a loan officer had settled with his
employer on a wrongful discharge complaint, of which $4,864,547 was
paid to the plaintiff and $3,864,012 was paid directly to his attorneys.61
The Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiff was allowed to exclude
from his taxable income the portion of the recovery paid directly to his
attorneys.62 This decision was based largely on the applicable state’s
attorney lien law, which was interpreted essentially to transfer to the
attorney a portion of the plaintiff’s cause of action.63 The satisfaction of
the attorney’s portion of the claim at settlement was construed as merely a
recovery by the attorney on the attorney’s separate property interest,
essentially as a co-tenant with the plaintiff.64
Similarly, Banks involved a settlement in the amount of $464,000 for
an alleged employment discrimination and civil rights violation, of which
$150,000 was paid to the plaintiff’s attorney.65 The Sixth Circuit refused
to apply the assignment of income doctrine of Earl, giving the following
reasons: (1) the claim was merely a contingent expectancy at the time the
attorney was retained; (2) the lawsuit was tantamount to a partnership or
joint venture, two-thirds owned by the plaintiff, and one-third owned by
the attorney; (3) the agreement was not motivated by tax avoidance; and
(4) application of the doctrine would result in double taxation.66
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Banaitis
and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Banks in a consolidated case, holding
that the taxpayer plaintiffs should include in their income the portion of
litigation recovery paid to their attorneys pursuant to contingent fee
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003).
345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003).
Banks, 543 U.S. at 430-31.
340 F.3d at 1078.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1081-82.
Oregon law . . . affords attorneys generous property interests in judgments and
settlements . . . . Put simply, Oregon law vests attorneys with property interests
that cannot be extinguished or discharged by the parties to the action except by
payment to the attorney . . . . Because of the unique features of Oregon law, we
conclude that fees paid directly to [the attorney] were not includable in
Banaitis’ gross income for the relevant year.”
Id. at 1082-83.
64. Id. at 1083.
65. Comm’r v. Banks, 345 F.3d 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 386.
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agreements.67 The Court based its reasoning, in large part, on the
assignment of income doctrine initially set forth in Earl.68 The Court
stated, “[t]he Commissioner maintains that a contingent-fee agreement
should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a
portion of the client’s income from any litigation recovery. We agree with
the Commissioner.”69 Accordingly, gains should be taxed to those who
earn them, and taxpayers should be prevented from avoiding taxation
through arrangements and contracts devised to prevent income when paid
from vesting (even for a second) in the one who earned it. The Court
likewise drew comparison to Horst,70 a more analogous case than Earl,71
in that it addressed assignment of income from property rather than
services (assuming one views the income-producing asset in Banks as
property in the form of the lawsuit or cause of action).72 The Banks Court
cited Horst for the proposition that the taxpayer who owns or controls the
source of income also controls the disposition of that which he could have
received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the
means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants.73 The Court in Banks
determined that the income-generating asset in that case was the cause of
action itself, which clearly remains in the dominion and control of the
plaintiff until recovery, despite the plaintiff’s suggestion that the attorneyclient relationship should be viewed as a sort of business partnership or
joint venture for tax purposes.74 The application of the assignment of
income doctrine by the Supreme Court in Banks has been persuasively
criticized in subsequent scholarship,75 but is unlikely to be overturned in
the near future.
67. Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 430 (2005).
68. Id. at 434 (“As Lucas explained, ‘no distinction can be taken according to the
motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from
that on which they grew.” (citations omitted)).
69. Id.
70. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
71. 281 U.S. 111 (1929).
72. See generally Katherine D. Black, Michael D. Black & Stephen T. Black, Taxation
of Contingency Fees: Deductions for Expenses?, TAX NOTES, Feb. 8, 2010, at 1.
73. 543 U.S. at 434-35.
74. Id. at 435-36.
75. See Brant J. Hellwig, The Supreme Court’s Casual Use of the Assignment of Income
Doctrine, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 751 (arguing against the Supreme Court’s expansion of the
assignment of income doctrine to arm’s length assignments for consideration, and noting
that the same conclusion could have been reached in Banks simply by finding that taxpayers
realize a taxable benefit when their obligations to compensation their attorneys is
discharged). See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of the criticism of the assignment of
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The precise tax issue involved in Banks was addressed by legislation
even before the case was decided. After the controversies comprising
Banks arose, Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.76
The Act added current Code § 62(a)(20), allowing a taxpayer, in
computing adjusted gross income, to deduct attorney’s fees and court
costs paid by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer in connection with any action
involving a claim of unlawful discrimination.77 Because these are socalled “above-the-line” deductions, they may be taken even when the
AMT applies and are not subject to the two percent of adjusted gross
income (“AGI”) floor.78 Since this amendment effectively eliminated
much of the concern of potentially overreaching taxation in the Banks
case, the attention of practitioners, and perhaps scholars, has been
somewhat diminished.
However, the Banks opinion still stands for the proposition that a
plaintiff, whose award is otherwise taxable, will not be able to exclude
that portion of the recovery that is directly paid to the attorney.79 As
described above, interest paid on a taxpayer’s non-taxable recovery (e.g.,
for physical injuries) is taxable itself.80 When combined with the holding
of Banks, this means that the prevailing plaintiff is really paying tax on
the attorney’s portion of the interest recovery as well.
The post-Code § 62(a)(20) enactment issues unique to partially taxable
and partially non-taxable awards are illuminated by the facts of Estate of
Clarks v. United States,81 which is directly referenced in Banks.82 On
June 28, 1988, the family of Arthur Clarks received a jury verdict in the
amount of $9,400,000 against K-Mart for injuries Mr. Clarks incurred
when he was unloading a truck at a K-Mart facility.83 Arthur Clarks’
portion of the award was $5,600,000, plus interest, and the remainder was

income doctrine.
76. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418, 1546 (2004).
77. I.R.C. § 62(e)(2010) defines “unlawful discrimination” to include any act that is
unlawful, for example, under certain provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Family and Medical Leave Act, the Fair Housing Act, and numerous other federal, state, and
local laws.
78. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A).
79. 543 U.S. at 430.
80. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
81. No. 96-CV-60446-AA, 1998 WL 839415, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 1998), rev’d,
202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
82. 543 U.S. at 431.
83. Clarks, 1998 WL 839415, at *1.
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awarded to his wife and children on their claims.84 After an extensive
appeals process, K-Mart paid Clarks $11,307,837.55 in satisfaction of his
portion of the judgment in 1991.85 This amount consisted of $5,600,000
for the jury award and $5,707,837.55 in interest.86 Clarks paid his
attorneys a total fee of $3,766,471.21 ($1,901,314.67 based on the interest
portion of the award, and $1,865,156.54 based on the damages award) and
costs in the amount of $8,432.90.87 It was undisputed that the $5,600,000
resulting from the jury’s award was not taxable.88 Clarks died in 1992,
and his estate was assessed a deficiency of $254,298 because it failed to
report the interest used to pay attorney’s fees and the portion of the costs
that related to judgment interest.89 The IRS argued that the interest paid
on a personal injury judgment was taxable, whether paid to an attorney
under a contingency agreement or not.90 The amounts payable to the
attorney with respect to the interest award would, however, be a belowthe-line miscellaneous itemized deduction, subject to the two percent AGI
limitation and not allowed in computing the alternative minimum tax.91
While the district court agreed with the IRS, the Sixth Circuit held that the
amounts paid directly to the attorney were not taxable.92 Looking to the
fruit-and-tree metaphor of Lucas v. Earl, the Sixth Circuit concluded with
the following analogy:
The present transaction under scrutiny is more like a division
of property than an assignment of income. Here the client as
assignor has transferred some of the trees in his orchard, not
merely the fruit from the trees. The lawyer has become a
tenant in common of the orchard owner and must cultivate and
care for and harvest the fruit of the entire tract. Here the
lawyer’s income is the result of his personal skill and
judgment, not the skill or largess of a family member who
wants to split his income to avoid taxation. The income should
84. Id.
85. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855.
86. Id.
87. Clarks, 1998 WL 839415, at *1.
88. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855. “At no time has the non-interest portion of the award
($5,600,000) been at issue since it is clearly not taxable as income pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §
104(a)(2).” Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
92. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858.
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be charged to the one who earned it and received it, not as
under the government’s theory of the case, to the one who
neither received it nor earned it.93
While this distinction was particularly compelling in the Clarks case,
which involved an underlying non-taxable award, the Sixth Circuit’s
ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court in Banks.94 Accordingly,
under current Supreme Court doctrine, amounts paid directly to attorneys
under contingent fee arrangements, even when the underlying claim is
exempt from tax, are taxable to the plaintiff.95
II. The Role of Interest in Litigation
A. The Theory of Litigation Interest
A brief review of the policies supporting the taxation of interest and
disallowing deductions for expenses related to procuring non-taxable
interest as well as the purposes served by interest in the litigation context
reveals how, in the context of partially taxable and partially non-taxable
recoveries, the current tax regime frustrates those policies. In 1967, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals effectively described the policy behind
disallowing deductions for tax-exempt income in concluding that
deductions should not be allowed for a fiduciary’s fee to the extent such
fee is related to the management of municipal bonds that produced taxexempt interest.96 The court stated:
Not only does the language of the statute suggest that both §§
212(1) and (2) expenses must be apportioned between taxable
and nontaxable income; the policy underlying the statute also
suggests the same result . . . . [I]n 1941 the Supreme Court
held [in Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941)] that
investment counseling expenses were not deductible because
the then applicable section of the Code only allowed
deductions for “trade or business expenses.” However, since
nonbusiness income was included in gross income, Congress
enacted what is now §§ 212(1) and (2) which provides that
93.
94.
Clarks
Banks.
95.
96.

Id. at 858.
Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 431 (2005). Indeed, the Supreme Court cited
twice as the opinion on which the Sixth Circuit relied in achieving its decision in
Id. at 431.
Id. at 429-30.
Whittemore v. United States, 383 F.2d 824, 833-34 (8th Cir. 1967).
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certain nonbusiness expenses are deductible.
Thus, by
providing for nonbusiness expenses, Congress furthered the
underlying philosophy of a tax on net income rather than on
gross income.97
The court bolstered this historical context by including a statement of
Representative Wesley Disney:
The Internal Revenue Code provides that expenses incurred in
the trade or business of the taxpayer may be deducted in
arriving at net income. The law also provides that personal,
living or family expenses may not be deducted. There is left a
great border-land of doubt . . . . Since the income from such
investments is clearly taxable it is inequitable to deny the
deduction of expenses attributable to such investments.98
Accordingly, the enactment of Code §§ 212(1) and (2) provided
matching of nonbusiness expenses with nonbusiness income.99 Likewise,
to the extent that the nonbusiness income was excluded from the gross
taxable income, the corresponding expense should not be allowed.
Otherwise, “the taxpayer would receive a double advantage in that he
could take a deduction against other taxable income and yet receive tax
free the income to which the expense related. The purpose of § 265(1) is
to eliminate this double advantage.”100
The “double advantage” would certainly accrue if a deduction were
allowed for expenses paid or incurred to obtain tax-exempt bond interest.
Likewise, a plaintiff recovering an entirely tax-exempt amount would be
doubly advantaged if she were allowed to offset other taxable income
(e.g., her salary) by the legal expenses and court costs incurred to obtain
the non-taxable amount.
The figures that follow, however, will
97. Id. at 833.
98. Id. at 834 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 46, 74-76 (1942)). The existing law
allows taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in connection with a trade or business. Due
partly to the inadequacy of the statute and partly to court decisions, nontrade or nonbusiness
expenses are not deductible, although nontrade or nonbusiness income is fully subject to tax.
The bill corrects this inequity by allowing all of the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred for the production or collection of income or for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income. Thus, whether or not the
expense is in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business, if it is expended in the pursuit
of income or in connection with property held for the production of income, it is allowable.
H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 74-76.
99. Whittemore, 383 F.2d at 834.
100. Id.
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demonstrate that no such advantage is likely when a plaintiff’s recovery
includes a taxable interest component. Instead, the plaintiff recovering
taxable interest on top of an otherwise non-taxable award will usually
have significant costs involved, tied to both the taxable and non-taxable
components of the award, and an often worthless deduction for those
costs. Therefore, it is at least not inconsistent with the policy behind the
limitation of Code § 265 to allow a deduction for expenditures made to
procure such recoveries to the extent income is ultimately taxed.
As to the purpose of interest in litigation, the primary consideration
seems to be one of making the plaintiff whole for the plaintiff’s losses by
compensating the plaintiff for the lost time value of money when the
plaintiff had no access to the ultimate recovery. This theory is applicable
to both pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest:101 “The award
of interest is founded on the theory that there has been a deprivation of
use of money or its equivalent and that the sole function of interest is to
101. See generally City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189,
195 (1995) (“The essential rationale for awarding prejudgment interest is to ensure that an
injured party is fully compensated for its loss.”). This purpose has been expressed by a
number of courts in both the pre-judgment and post-judgment contexts.
The purpose of the award of prejudgment interest is to make the plaintiff whole
from the date of the loss once the jury determines the defendant’s liability for
damages and their amount. Once the jury sets the amount of damages to be
awarded, the damages are retroactively considered liquidated damages, and the
plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest back to the date that the damages
were due.
Capitol Env’t. Servs., Inc. v. Earth Tech., Inc., 25 So.3d 593, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(citing Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212, 215 (Fla. 1985)).
[T]he purpose of postjudgment interest is to compensate the successful plaintiff
for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between the
ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the defendant . . . . The
verdict assesses damages up to the time that it is rendered; however, payment
does not occur immediately upon return of the verdict. Postjudgment interest
represents the cost of withholding the amount owed the plaintiff once that sum
has been determined in a court proceeding.
Poleto v. Consol. Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 1280 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Turner v. Japan
Lines, Ltd., 702 F.2d 752, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1983); Hooks v. Wash. Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d
614, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Brian P. Miller, Comment, Statutory Post-Judgment
Interest: The Effect of Legislative Changes After Judgment And Suggestions for
Construction, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 609-10 (1994) (stating, “[t]here are two discernible
purposes for post-judgment interest: 1) compensation to the judgment creditor for not
having use of the money owed; and 2) punishment of the judgment debtor to encourage him
or her to pay the judgment without undue delay. . . . Judicial decisions in very few states
have viewed post-judgment interest as a measure designed to punish the judgment debtor for
not paying the amount of the judgment.” (citations omitted)).
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make whole the party aggrieved. It is not to provide a windfall for either
party.”102 Again, “The allowance of interest rests on an attempt by courts
to award compensation to the plaintiff for the delay involved between the
date of the injury (the time that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation)
and the date of the award or judgment.”103
If one accepts that interest awarded on personal injury recoveries is
simply designed to keep the plaintiff in the same position economically as
when the original judgment was awarded or the injury was suffered, then
tax policy should promote this purpose and not punish the taxpayer whose
personal injury award is coupled with interest. This policy would
possibly support exclusion of the interest entirely from income of the
plaintiff. However, I do not go that far. Instead, I propose that, because
in most cases the assignment of income doctrine requires inclusion of
both the plaintiff’s recovery and the attorney’s recovery in the plaintiff’s
income, the plaintiff should be allowed either a deduction to the extent of
income inclusion or the ability to exclude interest income to the extent of
the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenditures incurred in the case (not just
expenditures incurred to produce the taxable income). This approach best
approximates the amount necessary to make the plaintiff whole when the
plaintiff’s entire tax situation is considered, yet prevents a complete
windfall for the plaintiff by limiting the deduction or exclusion to her
actual expenses.
B. Allocation of Fees and Costs Related to Interest
Having established that the portion of a successful plaintiff’s recovery
paid directly to the attorney under a contingent fee arrangement must be
included in the plaintiff’s gross income and that the plaintiff is only
allowed a deduction under Code § 212 for attorney’s fees and court costs
to the extent that such expenses relate to the recovery of taxable income,
one must determine how to allocate the amount of the expenses between
those that relate to taxable recoveries and those that relate to non-taxable

102. Joseph L. Marino, Judgments and Their Enforcements, in Civil Practice Law and
Rules, in 3 WEST’S MCKINNEY’S FORMS CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES § 8:3 (2011)
(citing 155 Henry Owners Corp. v. Lovlyn Realty Co., 647 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1996); Kaiser v.
Fishman, 590 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1992); 5 WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ¶
5001.10)).
103. Jacob A. Stein, Attorney’s Fees and Interest, in 3 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGES TREATISE § 17:58 (3d ed. 2011).
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recoveries.104 There are at least two alternative approaches that could
apply to this allocation: (1) divide the expenses between taxable and nontaxable amounts according to the split of the ultimate recovery between
such amounts (a proportionate approach) or (2) divide the expenses based
on the amount of the work or nature of costs actually related to the
respective recoveries (an “origin of the claim”105 approach).106
Case law appears to support a proportionate division of the expenses
based on the relative amounts of the ultimate recovery that are taxable and
non-taxable. In Church v. Commissioner,107 the plaintiff taxpayer
recovered $250,000 of excludable compensatory personal injury damages,
$235,000 of punitive damages (also excludable under the Commissioner’s
concession), and $140,872.71 of taxable interest.108 The taxpayer also
paid $253,568.85 in attorney’s fees and court costs pursuant to a
contingent fee arrangement.109 The Tax Court determined that “due to
[its] holding that part of the total award is exempt from income, the
$253,568.85 in attorney’s fees . . . must be allocated between the exempt
portion and the non-exempt portion of the award.”110 The court decided
that the appropriate allocation formula was to multiply the total attorney’s
104. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 124, 133 (1993) (“The parties have agreed
that if we hold that petitioners’ interest award is includable in income, the attorney’s fees
attributable to interest are deductible under section 212(1). Because we have held that the
interest is includable in income, petitioners will be allowed to deduct the portion of their
attorney’s fees attributable to interest.”) (citing Stocks v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 1, 18 (1992);
Metzger v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 834, 860 (1987), aff’d without published opinion, 845 F.2d
1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Church v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110-11 (1983)).
105. See Black, Black, & Black, supra note 72, at 2 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200823012 (Mar. 10, 2008)).
106. While these approaches appear to carry the day, there are occasional cases in which
the IRS appears to concede that the portion of the attorney’s fee relating to the non-taxable
recovery could simply be excluded from the plaintiff’s income. For example, in Sinyard v.
Commissioner, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001), the court noted that “legal fees and costs of
$63,152 were allocated to the nontaxed personal injury damages and by agreement with the
Commissioner excluded from income.” Id. at 758 (emphasis added). The $63,152 of
excluded legal fees and costs was exactly 20 percent of the $315,760 total attorney’s fees.
The plaintiff’s non-taxable personal injury award was exactly 20 percent of his total
settlement ($109,429 excluded personal injury component/$547,146 total settlement). Id.
This may have been a strategic concession on the part of the IRS in order to avoid litigation
of the IRS’s then-uncertain (i.e., pre-Banks) position that the attorney’s fees could be
included in the plaintiff’s income in a contingent fee situation.
107. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
108. Id. at 1106.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1111.
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fee by a fraction, the numerator of which was the non-exempt (i.e.
taxable) income and the denominator of which was the total award.111
Following that approach, “[t]he proper allocation result[ed] in a section
212(1) deduction of $57,073.80[,]”112 determined as follows:
“$253,568.85[attorney’s fees and costs] x $140,872.71 (non-exempt income) = $57,073.80”113
0000000000000000000000000000000 000$625,872.71 (total award)

While this approach is perhaps the most intuitive and straightforward, it
focuses on the ultimate result of the award or settlement instead of the
nature of the expenses incurred to produce the recovery.114 An argument
could be made that legal expenses paid in pursuit of a partially taxable
recovery should only be deductible to the extent that such expenses
related specifically to the taxable portion of the recovery and not to the
non-taxable recovery. This would be similar to the origin-of-the-claim
analysis employed in determining the deductibility of expenses that are
partially personal and partially business related. For example, in United
States v. Gilmore,115 the Supreme Court was tasked with determining the
deductibility of a husband’s legal expenses incurred in divorce
proceedings against his wife related to a division of assets, some of which
were the husband’s business ventures.116 The Gilmore Court found
in favor of the view that the origin and character of the claim
with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its
potential consequences upon the fortune of the taxpayer, is the
controlling basic test of whether the expense was ‘business’ or
‘personal’ and hence whether it is deductible or not.117
This approach is likewise utilized to allocate legal expenses between
deductible business expenses and capital expenditures.118
Although the origin-of-the-claim approach is appealing for consistency,
allocating the attorney’s fees and court costs between amounts related to
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1111 n.8.
114. See Black, Black, & Black, supra note 72, at 2-3.
115. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
116. Id. at 40.
117. Id. at 49.
118. See, e.g., Clements v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1981-530 (1981) (“Whether legal fees
are deductible business expenses or capital expenditures depends on the ‘origin-of-theclaim.’”) (citing Redwood Empire Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 960, 977 (1977)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

346

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:325

recovery of non-taxable and taxable portions would be difficult, if not
impossible, in many cases. In particular, in contingent fee arrangements,
attorneys often do not track hours worked on the case.119 Because the fee
agreement is not based on hourly rates, contingent fee compensated
attorneys do not have the same need to allocate hours worked to particular
clients that hourly-compensated attorneys have. Further, even if the
plaintiff’s attorney did track time spent on the case, it may be extremely
difficult to allocate time between work performed to produce the taxable
interest (or punitive) damage award and that done in furtherance of the
non-taxable personal injury award.120 Indeed, the interest or punitive
award in most cases would not exist without the personal injury award, so
the amounts are inextricably tied to each other. Consider an attorney
representing a personal injury plaintiff who won a judgment at the trial
court level that carried post-judgment interest, and was required to defend
that judgment on appeal. The attorney would undoubtedly have a difficult
time distinguishing hours spent advocating for the affirmation of the
underlying award from those spent arguing to retain the interest
component of the award. Although there will be clear cases where the
amount or computation of interest is the only issue on appeal, those cases
will likely be rare, and any requirement to allocate hours or other work
product would be fraught with technical hurdles and extreme confusion.
C. Illustration
To illustrate the potential impact of interest over time on the litigant
taxpayer as well as the different allocation of expense approaches, let us
explore the following fact pattern: Plaintiff is injured in a commercial
vehicle accident and ultimately awarded $3,000,000 in compensatory
damages. Post-judgment interest runs at ten percent per annum beginning
the day after the judgment is rendered. To isolate the deduction problem
119. See, e.g., Mardirossian & Assocs. v. Ersoff, 153 Cal. App. 4th 257, 270 (2007)
(“Although none of M & A’s contingency fee lawyers kept billing records, each planned to
testify that he or she could recall the amount of time spent in total on Ersoff’s case, albeit not
the amount of time spent preparing each piece of correspondence, discovery or pleading.”).
120. Whether a pro rata approach accurately reflects the costs of producing the taxable
and tax-exempt portions is questionable. An allocation of fees based on the actual time
spent on each claim may present a more accurate alternative. However, rigorous records of
hourly fees are typically not maintained in litigation governed by contingent fee agreements.
Moreover, overlapping benefits from efforts to pursue taxable and tax-exempt claims may
make it difficult to trace attorney time to a particular claim over another. Edward A. Morse,
Taxing Plaintiffs: A Look at Tax Accounting for Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Costs, 107
DICK. L. REV. 405, 490-91 (2003) (citations omitted).
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and to simplify the calculation, assume that the plaintiff is unmarried, has
no dependents, and has no additional sources of income or itemized
deductions.121 The plaintiff has entered into a contingent fee arrangement
with the attorney which entitles the attorney to forty-five percent of the
gross recovery at any stage of the litigation beyond the jury trial.122
Finally, assume litigation expenses incurred to obtain the award will be
approximately ten percent of the recovery. All figures are based on tax
liability for 2011.
If the plaintiff were paid immediately after the jury trial, the plaintiff
would pocket approximately $1,350,000 after paying her attorney
$1,350,000 and litigation costs of $300,000.
Figure 1
Immediate Payment Following Jury Trial
$3,000,000
Non-taxable recovery
($1,350,000)
Attorney’s Fee (45%)
($300,000)
Costs
$1,350,000
Net to Plaintiff
However, let us assume (very realistically) that in addition to the
commercial vehicle driver and the driver’s employer or contracting firm,
several insurance carriers are named as parties, and appeals and additional
proceedings continued for at least five years following the jury verdict.
After five years, with interest compounding monthly, the interest
component is $1,935,000 and the gross recovery has grown from
$3,000,000 to $4,935,000. At this point, the plaintiff would be
responsible for an attorney’s fee of approximately $2,220,000 at forty-five
percent. Although it is likely the attorney might have negotiated for a
higher percentage of the recovery by this time, and that litigation costs

121. While not the subject of this article, the state tax impact is too significant to
completely ignore. To this end, I have included calculations reflecting some very typical
state tax consequences for the plaintiff. Assume for these purposes that the plaintiff is a
resident of Kansas and pays Kansas state income tax on any taxable portion of the award.
Kansas has compressed marginal individual income tax rates similar to the federal individual
income tax system. For an individual (non-joint) filer, a tax rate of 3.5% applies to the first
$15,000 of Kansas income; a rate of 6.25% applies to income between $15,000 and $30,000
and a rate of 6.45% applies to any excess of $30,000. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,110 (2008).
122. Again, this number would likely vary between one-third and fifty percent at various
points during the litigation, but for the sake of simplicity and isolating the tax issues, I have
maintained a forty-five percent attorney’s fee throughout the illustration.
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would have risen as well, we will keep the contingent fee percentage and
total amount of expenses constant in order to appreciate more easily the
tax consequences.
Figure 2
After 5 years (pre-tax)
Gross Recovery
$4,935,000
Attorney’s Fee
($2,220,000)
Costs
($300,000)
Recovery before taxes
$2,415,000
If the plaintiff is able to claim the entire amount of the attorney’s fee
and costs as a deduction, presumably by allocating those amounts entirely
to procuring taxable interest,123 she would still face federal tax liability of
$538,300 (arising from the $1,935,000 of interest).124 On the other hand,
if the plaintiff is able to deduct the attorney’s fees and costs only to the
extent that the award or settlement is taxable,125 her deduction would be
limited to thirty-nine percent of such costs because only thirty-nine
percent ($1,935,000/$4,935,000) of the total recovery is taxable.
Because of the operation of the AMT, this has no impact on the federal
tax liability,126 but in most cases results in a significant increase in state
123. This is an extremely unlikely, if not impossible, scenario, but one that demonstrates
the limited utility of the deduction for the attorney’s fees and costs, even if fully available.
124. The 100% deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff has
$1,935,000 of interest income, which is also her adjusted gross income (“AGI”). Her
deductible expenses would be $2,200,000 of attorney’s fees and $300,000 of other litigation
costs, which combined would be reduced by two percent of her AGI, or $38,700, to
$2,481,300. When added to the $3,700 personal exemption, her total deductions from AGI
are $2,485,000, resulting in a taxable income of ($550,000), obviously giving rise to no
regular tax. However, the AMT liability would be computed without the deduction for
attorney’s fees and expenses. The AMT exemption of $48,450 would be completely phased
out and therefore the taxable excess would be $1,935,000 on which a tentative minimum tax
of $538,300 would be due.
125. This approach is consistent with the Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1111
n.8 (1983), formula for allocating deductible and non-deductible attorney’s fees. See supra
text accompanying note 113.
126. The thirty-nine percent deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff
still has $1,935,000 of interest income, which is also her AGI. Her deductible expenses,
however, would be $866,000 of attorney’s fees (approximately thirty-nine percent of
$2,220,000 of fees paid) and $117,000 of other litigation costs (thirty-nine percent of
$300,000 of other litigation costs paid), which combined would be reduced by two percent
of her AGI, again $38,700, to $944,300. When added to the $3,700 personal exemption, her
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tax liability.127 Finally, if the plaintiff is only allowed to deduct the
portion of the fees and costs that could be traced to work actually
performed in furtherance of recovering taxable interest (under the originof-the-claim doctrine), perhaps ten percent or less of the expenses could
be deducted. In other words, under the ten percent deductibility scenario,
we are assuming that the plaintiff can only show that ten percent of the
attorney’s fees and other litigation costs relate to the recovery of taxable
interest, the remainder being disallowed as a deduction under § 212
because it relates to the non-taxable income from the personal injury
recovery. The ten percent deductibility scenario results in only a slightly
higher federal tax liability of $578,614.128

Recovery
before
Taxes
Federal Tax
State Tax
Net to
Plaintiff

Figure 3
After 5 Years (Tax Impact)1
If 100%
If deduction tied
deductible
to recovery
(39% taxable/
deductible)
$2,415,000
$2,415,000

If 10%
deductible
(origin-of
claim)
$2,415,000

$538,300
$0

$538,300
$63,283

$578,614
$110,432

$1,876,700

$1,813,417

$1,725,954

total deductions from AGI are $948,000, resulting in a taxable income of $987,000. This
taxable income gives rise to $322,764 of regular tax and $215,536 of alternative minimum
tax, for a total of $538,300 in total federal income taxes.
127. Kansas does not have an alternative minimum tax. In states like California that have
an alternative minimum tax, this calculation would obviously be different. CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE § 17062 (West 2010).
128. But note the significantly higher state tax liability of $110,432. The ten percent
deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff still has $1,935,000 of interest
income, which is also her AGI. Her deductible expenses, however, would be $222,000 of
attorney’s fees (ten percent of $2,220,000 of fees paid) and $30,000 of other litigation costs
(ten percent of $300,000 of other litigation costs paid), which combined would be reduced
by two percent of her AGI, again $38,700, to $213,300. When added to the $3,700 personal
exemption, her total deductions from AGI are $217,000, resulting in a taxable income of
$1,718,000. This taxable income gives rise to $578,614 of regular tax and no alternative
minimum tax.
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After seven years, the award has grown to approximately $6,000,000
due to accruing interest, which now is half of the award ($3,000,000 of
$6,000,000). Using the assumptions listed above, the successful plaintiff
would now be liable for $2,700,000 of the attorney’s fees (forty-five
percent of $6,000,000). To account for two additional years of
proceedings and filings, assume a modest increase in litigation expenses
of $50,000, bringing total costs to $350,000.
Figure 4
After 7 years:
Gross Recovery
$6,000,000
Attorney’s Fee
($2,700,000)
Costs
($350,000)
Recovery before Taxes
$2,950,000

After seven years, the federal tax liability would be $836,500 if the fees
and costs were either completely deductible129 or deductible to the extent
of taxable recovery (fifty percent)130 and $940,269 if the expenses were
only ten percent deductible.131
129. The 100% deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff has
$3,000,000 of interest income, which is also her AGI. Her deductible expenses would be
$2,700,000 of attorney’s fees and $350,000 of other litigation costs, which combined would
be reduced by two percent of her AGI, or $60,000, to $2,990,000. When added to the $3700
personal exemption, her total deductions from AGI are $2,993,700, resulting in a taxable
income of $6300, which gives rise to $630 of regular tax. However, the alternative minimum
taxable income would be $3,000,000 (unreduced for personal exemptions or miscellaneous
itemized deductions), which generates an alternative minimum tax of $835,870 and a total of
$836,500 in federal income taxes.
130. The fifty percent deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff has
$3,000,000 of interest income, which is also her AGI. Her deductible expenses would be
$1,350,000 of attorney’s fees (fifty percent of $2,700,000 of fees paid) and $175,000 of
other litigation costs (fifty percent of $350,000 of other litigation costs paid), which
combined would be reduced by two percent of her AGI, or $60,000, to $1,465,000. When
added to the $3700 personal exemption, her total deductions from AGI are $1,468,700,
resulting in a taxable income of $1,531,300. This taxable income gives rise to $513,269 of
regular tax. Again, the $3,000,000 of alternative minimum taxable income generates
$323,231 of alternative minimum tax, for a total of $836,500 in total federal income taxes.
131. This scenario produces an even more significant variation of the state tax liability,
up to $177,080. The ten percent deductibility scenario is calculated as follows: the plaintiff
still has $3,000,000 of interest income, which is also her AGI. Her deductible expenses
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Again, we arrive at this result because although compensation (whether
by settlement or judgment) for personal injuries is excluded from
income,132 interest earned or accrued with respect to such payments is not
excludable from income.133 Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Commissioner v. Banks,134 even if a portion of the plaintiff’s award is
payable directly to his or her attorney under a contingency fee
arrangement, that amount is taxable to the plaintiff.135 While a taxpayer is
allowed to deduct his or her attorney’s fees attributable to the taxable
portion of the recovery,136 the deduction is a miscellaneous itemized
deduction, limited to the amount that exceeds two percent of the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income,137 and will be subject to the AMT,
which disallows the use of miscellaneous itemized deductions, including
attorney’s fees, in computing the tax liability.138
Figure 5
After 7 Years (Tax Impact)
If 100%
If deduction tied to
deductible
recovery
(50% taxable/
deductible)
Recovery
before Taxes
Federal Tax
State Tax
Net to
Plaintiff

If 10%
deductible
(based on
origin-of claim)

$2,950,000
$836,500
$271

$2,950,000
$836,500
$96,423

$2,950,000
$940,269
$177,080

$2,113,229

$2,017,077

$1,832,651

would be $270,000 of attorney’s fees (approximately ten percent of $2,700,000 of fees paid)
and $35,000 of other litigation costs (ten percent of $350,000 of other litigation costs paid),
which combined would be reduced by two percent of her AGI, or $60,000, to $245,000.
When added to the $3700 personal exemption, her total deductions from AGI are $248,700,
resulting in a taxable income of $2,751,300. This taxable income gives rise to $940,269 of
regular tax. There is no alternative minimum tax liability under this scenario.
132. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(2010).
133. Id. § 61(a)(4).
134. 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
135. Id. at 430.
136. See I.R.C. § 212 (2006).
137. Id. § 67.
138. Id. § 56(b)(1)(A).
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A few points are readily apparent when examining the life cycle of the
hypothetical lawsuit involving a significant interest component. Perhaps
most important, the plaintiff benefits less than almost any other party as
the lawsuit drags on through years of litigation. Using the pro rata (thirtynine percent) deductibility scenario, the plaintiff’s net recovery grew by
$463,417 (from $1,350,000 to $1,813,417) during the five years following
the jury verdict, or approximately 34.33%. During this same time, the
IRS’s portion has increased from nothing (as the initial award was not
taxable) to $538,300. The attorney’s share has increased by $870,000
(from $1,350,000 to $2,220,000), or 64.44%.
Between years five and seven, still using the pro rata (now fifty
percent) deductibility scenario, the plaintiff’s net recovery has increased
only $203,660 (from $1,813,417 to $2,017,077), or approximately
11.23%. Of course, the plaintiff has had no access to the award or
settlement funds in the meantime. In contrast, the federal government’s
take has increased by $298,200 (from $538,300 to $836,500), or
approximately 55.40%. Finally, the attorney’s portion has increased by
$480,000 (from $2,220,000 to $2,700,000), or approximately 21.62%.
In other words, after five years from the date of the jury award, under
the pro rata (thirty-nine percent) deductibility scenario, the plaintiff is
ultimately receiving only $463,417 of $1,935,000 of interest, or
approximately twenty-four cents of every dollar of interest recovered.
The federal government is getting approximately twenty-eight cents of
every dollar of interest ($538,300 of $1,935,000) and the plaintiff’s
attorney is entitled to approximately forty-five cents of every dollar of
interest ($870,000 of $1,935,000). Between years five and seven, the
plaintiff is receiving approximately nineteen cents of every dollar of
interest recovered ($203,660 of $1,065,000).
The IRS receives
approximately twenty-eight cents of every dollar of interest ($298,200 of
$1,065,000) and the plaintiff’s attorney retains approximately forty-five
cents of every dollar of interest recovered ($480,000 of $1,065,000).
During the seven year post-judgment period, the plaintiff is ultimately
receiving only $667,077 of $3,000,000 of interest, or approximately
twenty-two cents of every dollar of interest recovered. The Treasury is
getting approximately twenty-eight cents of every dollar of interest
($836,500 of $3,000,000) and the plaintiff’s attorney maintains forty-five
cents of every dollar of interest ($1,350,000 of $3,000,000).
The results clarify the point that the plaintiff’s attorney and the federal
government have much to gain from the lawsuit continuing for years
while the plaintiff’s relative recovery steadily diminishes. Clearly, the
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policy served by post-judgment interest of making the plaintiff whole for
injuries is not promoted in this context.
Additionally, litigation strategy may be impacted by these tax results.
While no one is suggesting that a plaintiff’s lawyer would intentionally
drag out a personal injury recovery unnecessarily,139 a new and perhaps
unnecessary strain on the attorney-client relationship is introduced when
the economic interests of the parties are not in accord, if not at odds.140
More likely, an astute defense counsel could suggest that it is in the
plaintiff’s best interest to settle for a lesser amount than the jury award
and accumulated interest early since the plaintiff will not be adequately
compensated for the time value of money as the lawsuit drags on. When
the plaintiff ultimately nets twenty percent or less of the interest paid,
while the IRS gets thirty percent and the plaintiff’s attorney continues to
receive forty-five percent, the relative motivation for an informed plaintiff
to settle earlier is obvious.
III. Previously Proposed Solutions to the Inclusion Problem
Courts and tax scholars have previously addressed the tax issues
presented by inclusion of the attorney’s portion of the plaintiff’s recovery
in the plaintiff’s gross income, but have primarily focused on the whollytaxable award context. Also, the solutions proposed have, for the most
part, been foreclosed by the Banks decision or present significant
conceptual or logistical hurdles. This part addresses some of those
proposals and examines their shortcomings in the partially non-taxable
recovery context.
A. Minority View Prior to Banks: Contingent Fee Arrangement Results in
Immediate Transfer of a Portion of the Claim to the Attorney
One minority view in the circuit split that existed prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Banks141 characterized contingent fee
arrangements as resulting in an immediate transfer of a portion of the

139. The lawyer has an obvious incentive to settle as soon as possible to recover costs
fronted for litigation and free up resources tied to the case.
140. Scholars have acknowledged a similar tension between the attorney’s interests and
the interests of the client brought about by the alternative minimum tax trap. Hellwig &
Polsky, supra note 39, at 922 (“[B]ecause of the AMT trap, it may actually be in the
plaintiff’s best interests to not petition for fees. In contrast, it would obviously be in the
attorney’s best interests for the plaintiff to file the petition, as it would increase his fees.”).
141. 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
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plaintiff’s claim to the attorney.142 This was the position taken by the
Ninth Circuit interpreting Oregon law in Banaitis v. Commissioner,143
which was consolidated into the Supreme Court’s decision in Banks.144 In
Banaitis, the Ninth Circuit held that “Oregon law vests attorneys with
property interests that cannot be extinguished or discharged by the parties
to the action except by payment to the attorney.”145
The assignment or immediate transfer view appears to have originated
with the 1959 Fifth Circuit case, Cotnam v. Commissioner,146 in which a
plaintiff retained an attorney under a contingent fee arrangement to pursue
a contract claim relating to a promise to provide for the plaintiff in a
will.147 The Cotnam court relied upon an Alabama attorney’s lien law that
provided that attorneys had the same “right and power” over suits and
judgments to enforce their liens as their clients.148 In this sense, the court
determined that “[a]ttorneys have the same rights as their clients[,]” and
accordingly, “[u]nder Alabama law, [the plaintiff] could never have
received the [the attorney’s portion of the recovery], even if she had
settled the case directly with the Bank.”149 Therefore, “[t]his sum was
income to the attorneys but not to [the client].”150
Likewise, in Foster v. United States,151 the Eleventh Circuit found it
inappropriate to tax the plaintiff on amounts due immediately to her
attorney under a contingency fee arrangement. In that case, “[a]fter the
jury verdict, but before an appeal was filed, Foster negotiated with her
attorneys that, if they represented her on appeal, they could take all of the
post-judgment interest, if any, rather than just the half they were entitled

142. Jackson, supra note 41, at 69-72. See generally Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d
1275 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled by Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005); Davis v.
Comm’r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854
(6th Cir. 2000); Cotnam v. Comm’r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959), overruled by Comm’r v.
Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
143. 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005); see
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
144. 543 U.S. at 431.
145. 340 F.3d at 1083 (emphasis added).
146. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
147. Id. at 120-21, 125.
148. Id. at 125 (citing 46 ALA. CODE § 64 (1940)).
149. Id. (citing Denson v. Ala. Fuel & Iron Co., 73 So. 525 (Ala. 1916); W. Ry. of Ala. v.
Foshee, 62 So. 500 (Ala. 1913)).
150. Id. at 125.
151. 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled by Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426
(2005).
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to based on the pre-trial contingency fee agreement.”152 The Eleventh
Circuit refused to look simply to the assignment of income doctrine, and
instead found the arrangement “more like a division of property than an
assignment of income.”153
Professors Brant Hellwig and Greg Polsky have published extensively
in the areas of taxation of litigation expenses, the alternative minimum tax
(“AMT”) implications on awards, and structuring settlements from a tax
perspective.154 Their 2004 article, Litigation Expenses and the Alternative
Minimum Tax,155 described the AMT trap that faces successful litigants
and evaluated the then-current arguments and proposals for ameliorating
the effects of the AMT on recoveries.156 Hellwig and Polsky criticized the
immediate transfer approach taken by the pre-Banks minority circuits,
arguing against construing the contingent fee arrangement as an
immediate transfer of anything for tax purposes.157 Instead, in their view,
the contingent arrangement was merely a promise to pay on the part of the
plaintiff upon disposition of the claim.158 In that case, the plaintiff would
include the entire recovery in gross income and then deduct the fees once
paid.159 Further, even if the contingent fee arrangement were deemed an
immediate transfer, tax law would still require inclusion and deduction.160
152. Id. at 1279.
153. Id. at 1280 (quoting Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857-58 (6th
Cir. 2000)).
154. See, e.g., Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39; Hellwig, supra note 75; Gregg D.
Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing Structured Settlements, 51 B.C. L. REV. 39 (2010).
155. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39.
156. Id. at 901-02, 912-21, 931-38.
157. Id. at 906-07.
158. Id. at 906.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 907-08; Jackson, supra note 41, at 95.
The granddaddy of those cases, Cotnam v. Commissioner, supra, a 2-1 opinion
(so far as relates to the issue in our case) with Judge Wisdom dissenting, states
its rationale as follows: ‘The amount of the contingent fee was earned, and
well earned, by the attorneys. True, in a remote rather than a proximate sense,
the entire amount of the judgment had also been earned by Mrs. Cotnam, but
she could never have collected anything or have enjoyed any economic benefit
unless she had employed attorneys, and to do so, she had to part with forty per
cent of her claim long before the realization of any income from it.’ 263 F.2d
at 126. This rationale badly flunks the test of neutral principles. It is often the
case that to obtain income from an asset one must hire a skilled agent and pay
him up front; that expense is a deductible expense, not an exclusion from
income.
Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Code § 83 would govern the transfer in connection with services, and
because the lawyer’s interest would be “subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture” until liquidation of the claim, the tax consequences would be
held in abeyance until the risk of forfeiture lapsed (i.e., upon
liquidation).161 At liquidation, however, the plaintiff would realize gain
on the disposition of the attorney’s portion of the claim.162
Another concern with the immediate transfer approach is whether an
attorney could ethically receive a property interest in the underlying cause
of action.163 The immediate interest transfer approach relies in large part
on state attorney lien laws, which can give an attorney a priority creditor
status with respect to litigation proceeds.164 When this priority is
161. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 907.
162. Id.
A brief consideration of the tax ramifications of treating a plaintiff who is party
to a contingent fee agreement as realizing the benefit of the attorney's services
upon assigning a portion of the claim proceeds to the attorney illustrates the
fallacy of treating the fee agreement as effecting a present assignment of
anything for tax purposes. It is far more likely that the plaintiff and attorney
each viewed the fee agreement as memorializing the plaintiff's conditional
promise to compensate the attorney based on a predetermined formula, a
characterization which would not yield tax consequences unless and until the
attorney was actually paid the contingent fee. Furthermore, this must have
been what the Court had in mind in Banks, as it regarded the taxpayers as
realizing gross income from the payment of their attorney's fees in the year of
payment . . . . Specifically, the Court did not view the fee agreement as
effecting a completed assignment, but rather as constituting a promise to pay in
the future. This leap of faith negates the relevance of the assignment of income
doctrine to the transaction. This reconciliation of the Banks decision seems
appropriate, as the assignment of income doctrine is best understood as an
equitable doctrine to be used to attribute gratuitously assigned income to the
assignor when necessary to achieve a reasonable and fair imposition of the tax
burden.
Hellwig, supra note 75, at 789-90 (citations omitted).
163. See Jackson, supra note 41, at 123 (noting ethical concerns arising from the
assignment of income doctrine and stating that treating lawyers and their clients as partners
undermines a lawyer’s objectivity, independence and the obligation to act as an agent of the
client for the exclusive benefit of the client); Reece, supra note 21, at 332-33.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 127-33.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Banks, several United States circuit
courts in their discussions of whether or not to include contingent attorney fees
in the taxpayer's gross income had included in their opinions the effect of state
attorney lien statutes. As described in Estate of Clarks, the common law
attorney's lien is unlike ‘any other lien known to the law’ because it creates a
property right in the judgment without the attorney having possession of the
judgment awarded. ‘It is a peculiar lien, to be enforced by peculiar methods.’
In fact, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
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construed as a property interest such that it removes the portion of the
recovery paid directly to the attorney from the plaintiff’s taxable income,
one can legitimately question the propriety of the arrangement.165 If the
attorney actually acquires a portion of the underlying cause of action,
even with diminished rights to the ultimate disposition of such a property
interest, the attorney may run afoul of the letter, if not the intent, of the
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”).166
MRPC 1.8 provides that an attorney “shall not acquire a proprietary
interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is
conducting for a client.”167 The attorney may, however, “acquire a lien
authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and . . . contract
with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.”168 Although
the model rule clearly allows the attorney to contract with the client for a
contingent fee, which is precisely the arrangement at issue, any attempt to
construe the relationship or the relative ownership of the property (i.e., the
cause of action) as something beyond a contingent promise to pay is at
least arguably in conflict with the attorney’s ethical responsibility to
refrain from interfering with the client’s proprietary rights in the action.169
Given this ethical framework, it may be wise for lawyers to avoid future
attempts to persuade courts that their rights in the case exceed anything
other than those of a priority creditor.
Another practical consideration regarding the attempt to adopt an
immediate transfer approach to the contingent fee arrangement is that
reliance on state attorney lien statutes requires a state-by-state analysis170
Raymond even went so far as to say that ‘to the extent that most courts to
consider the issue have indicated that the analysis of state law is determinative,
this is perhaps not a true ‘circuit split.’’
Jennifer J. Loomis, The Taxation of Contingent Attorney Fees: Did the Supreme Court
Correctly Decide Commissioner v. Banks?, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 115, 148 (2006) (citations
omitted).
165. See Reece, supra note 21, at 332 (“[A]ssignment of a legal interest to an attorney
handling that interest as the client's agent, carries unmistakable ethical twists,” and
“‘[a]lthough the rules of ethics require attorneys to zealously advocate for their clients,
allowing an attorney to become a ‘partner’ in a client's cause of action creates ethical
problems.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Bernard J. Grant, III, No Taxation Without
Realization: Srivastava v. Commissioner, The Fifth Circuit’s Answer to Tax Treatment of
Attorney’s Fees Under a Contingency Agreement, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 363, 376 (2001)).
166. Id. at 332-33.
167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i) (2011).
168. Id. 1.8(i)(1)-(2).
169. See Reece, supra note 21, at 333-34.
170. See id. at 319-20 (“[I]ncome to a particular taxpayer depends strictly on state law
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and produces disparate results depending on the exact wording of a state’s
particular law.171 It is beyond question that property rights and the
priority of an attorney/creditor are primarily determined under state
law.172 It is also clear that minor distinctions in a state’s attorney lien
statute can produce dramatically different assessments of the relative
rights of the attorney and client with respect to the underlying cause of
action.173 For example, the Ninth Circuit in Banaitis found Oregon
attorney lien law unique:

definition of property or property interests. The Cotnam court and others argued that state
statutes creating attorney’s liens actually create a proprietary interest in the claim.” (citation
omitted)).
171. Id. at 331 (“The interpretations of state equitable lien statutes create a serious
problem of non-uniformity in the taxation of awards to clients.”).
172. The Ninth Circuit in Banaitis v. Commissioner viewed the question of whether the
attorney’s portion of a recovery under a contingency fee agreement should be included as
part of the plaintiff’s gross income as a two-part inquiry: “(1) how state law defines the
attorney’s rights in the action, and (2) how federal law operates in light of this state law
definition of interests.” 340 F.3d 1074, 1081 (2003) (citations omitted), reversed by
Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005); see Reece, supra note 21, at 326 (“The attorney lien
which is important for the discussion herein is the ‘charging lien.’ An attorney’s charging
lien is a common law, sometimes a statutory, equitable lien, like a mechanic's lien.”); see
also Thad Austin Davis, Cotnam v. Commissioner and the Income Tax Treatment of
Contingency–Based Attorneys’ Fees The Alabama Attorney’s Charging Lien Meets Lucas
v. Earl Head-On, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1683, 1688, 1690 (2000) (“The attorney’s charging lien
exists in both statutory and common law form. . . . The charging lien often has priority over
other liens and can even take priority over a defendant's right of setoff.”).
173. Reece explains:
In a state where an attorney’s lien is interpreted as an equitable property
interest, the courts could view the contingent fee agreement as an assignment of
property right . . . and hold that part of the award is not taxable to the client. In
a state where an attorney’s lien is deemed a security interest, the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine will require clients to pay taxes on the full
amount of the award because attorney lien statutes in those states are
interpreted to provide no proprietary right in the claim.
Reece, supra note 21, at 331-32; see also Jackson, supra note 41, at 81-82 (“The court
agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Srivastava, that ‘the answer [as to whether to
apply Cotnam] does not depend on the intricacies of an attorney's bundle of rights against
the opposing party under the law of the governing state.’ The court recognized that such a
state-by-state approach would not provide uniformity of result in tax consequences
throughout the country.” (alteration in original) (quoting Banks v. Comm’r, 345 F.3d 373,
386 (6th Cir. 2003)); Reece, supra note 21, at 330 (“First, the dependence upon state
interpretation of attorney lien statutes creates a lack of uniformity between the states and
may violate the Constitutional pronouncement of uniformity in taxation.”).
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Oregon law . . . affords attorneys generous property interests in
judgments and settlements. . . . Put simply, Oregon law vests
attorneys with property interests that cannot be extinguished or
discharged by the parties to the action except by payment to the
attorney. . . . Because of the unique features of Oregon law, we
conclude that fees paid directly to [the attorney] were not
includable in Banaitis’ gross income for the relevant year.174
Moreover, courts analyzing state lien statutes would likely make a wide
range of determinations of these relative rights and as a result, lend great
uncertainty to the plaintiff’s tax situation for a number of years until a
consensus could be reached by the courts or uniform laws enacted. More
importantly, there remains a serious question about whether there is any
substantive distinction among the state attorney lien laws or whether,
instead, the “economic reality facing the taxpayer-plaintiff” is not
meaningfully affected.175
Although many of these issues were not directly addressed by the
Supreme Court in Banks, the ruling in Banks, relying on the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine to place the income initially in the
plaintiff’s hands for tax purposes, forecloses the immediate transfer
argument for the foreseeable future.176 Those seeking aid for plaintiffs
shouldering the tax burden of the attorney’s share of their recovery will
have to look elsewhere for a realistic possibility of relief.
B. Attacking the Use of the Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine
The majority of circuit courts177 prior to Commissioner v. Banks, and
ultimately the Supreme Court in Banks, required the plaintiff to include
the recovery in whole and then take a deduction for the amounts paid to
the attorney pursuant to the contingent fee arrangement.178 These courts
relied, to one degree or another, on the anticipatory assignment of income

174. 340 F.3d at 1082-83. Similar state law specific determinations were made applying
Alabama law in Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959), and Foster v.
United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001).
175. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 910 (quoting Srvivasava v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d
353, 364 (2000)).
176. 543 U.S. 426, 435 (2005) (“In the case of a litigation recovery the incomegenerating asset is the cause of action that derives from the plaintiff’s legal injury. The
plaintiff retains dominion over this asset throughout the litigation.”).
177. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
178. Banks, 543 U.S. at 430, 434.
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doctrine enunciated in Lucas v. Earl179 and applied to income from
property in Helvering v. Horst.180 In 2004, Hellwig and Polsky argued
that the majority view of the circuits at that time inappropriately applied
the assignment of income doctrine to arm’s-length commercial
transactions like contingent fee arrangements.181 This position was
reiterated in Professor Leah Witcher Jackson’s 2005 article, Won the
Legal Battle, but at What Tax Costs to Your Client: Tax Consequences of
Contingency Fee Arrangements Leading up to and After Commissioner v.
Banks.182 In her article, Jackson explored the inclusion and deductibility
landscape immediately following the Banks decision.183 According to
Jackson, because the contingent fee agreement is an arm’s-length
agreement, with the attorney using her skill, training, and expertise to earn
a portion of the award, the shift of income cannot be considered to be
gratuitous and thus does not fall under the umbrella of the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine.184
Hellwig revisited this position following the Banks decision in 2006
and again concluded that the assignment of income doctrine was
inappropriately applied outside of the gratuitous transfer context.185
Hellwig noted that a significant justification for applying the assignment
of income doctrine rests on preventing taxpayers from undermining the
progressive tax system through intra-family or otherwise friendly
179. 281 U.S. 111 (1929); see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court first invoked the assignment of income doctrine in the context of an arm’s-length
transaction in United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 447 (1973). See Hellwig, supra note 75,
at 795-96.
180. 311 U.S. 112 (1940); see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
181. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 908-09 (describing the majority view in which
the courts determined that contingent fee arrangements transferred only the right to the
proceeds of the attorney’s fee portion of the recovery, and not that portion of the recovery,
and noting that because this would be a transfer of “income” rather than a transfer of
“property,” the transfer would be wholly ignored under the assignment of income doctrine
and instead taxed entirely to the plaintiff, who could then possibly deduct her costs to
produce the income).
182. Jackson, supra note 41.
183. Id. at 102-05.
184. Id. at 102.
185. Hellwig, supra note 75, at 780-81; see also Reece, supra note 21, at 315 (citing
Kathryn J. Ball, Horizontal Equity and the Tax Consequences of Attorney-Client Fee
Agreements, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 406 (2001); Stanislava B. Kimball, Explaining a Circuit
Split: Contingency Fees May Constitute Clients’ Gross Income Depending on Whether the
State Law Permits the Assignment of a Cause of Action to Create a Property Ownership
Interest, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 583 (2002)).
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transactions.186 Without the existence of this tax rate contravention
motivation in arm’s-length transactions, the normal principles of income
realization should be applied, and there is no need to assert the assignment
of income doctrine.187 Indeed, in Professor Hellwig’s view, Banks
expands the assignment of income doctrine to property transactions far
beyond the original utility of the doctrine and obfuscates the transactional
analysis of taxpayers in otherwise bona fide and straightforward
arrangements.188
Notwithstanding this criticism, it is clear that in the wake of Banks, the
Supreme Court will now view a contingent fee arrangement between an
attorney and a client as an anticipatory assignment of income,189 with the
result that the plaintiff will be unable to exclude from income the
attorney’s portion of a taxable award or payment.190 This again suggests
that a legislative solution will be necessary in order to provide plaintiffs
with relief from the tax burden resulting from inclusion of the attorney’s
contingent share of the recovery in the plaintiff’s taxable income.
C. Other Approaches
1. Partnership or Joint Venture
Another approach cited in the plaintiff’s argument in the Banks case
was to treat the contingent attorney fee arrangement as a type of
partnership agreement or joint venture.191 This argument suggests that in
186. Hellwig, supra note 75, at 772-73.
187. Id.; see also Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner: Continuing Confusion
Over the Assignment of Income Doctrine and Personal Service Income, 1 FLA. TAX REV.
623, 633 (1993) (“The vice of a gratuitous assignment of income is that, if respected for tax
purposes, it would enable the assignor to shift the incidence of tax on the assigned income to
one or more other taxpayers. . . . If, however, the assignor assigns his earned income for full
and adequate consideration, that is, if he ‘sells’ his right to the earned income for its full
value, the incidence of taxation will not be shifted since the taxpayer will receive, and report
as taxable income, one dollar for every dollar of income he assigns. Since the vice which
the doctrine seeks to prevent does not exist in this case, there is no reason to apply the
doctrine.”).
188. Hellwig, supra note 75, at 781-82. The assignment of income doctrine’s original
purpose was to “plug[] statutory gaps” in the I.R.C. and provide guidance to parties as to
which should report income in ambiguous situations. Id. at 781.
189. 543 U.S. 426, 434 (2005).
190. Black, Black & Black, supra note 72, at 1 (“The Supreme Court said that the
income-generating asset is the cause of action. The full value of the recovery from the cause
of action will be included in the taxpayers’ income under the assignment of income
doctrine.”).
191. Id. at 436 (“We further reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client relationship
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agreeing to the contingent fee contract, the plaintiff enters into a
partnership or joint venture with the attorney in which the attorney
contributes services and the plaintiff contributes a portion of either the
cause of action itself or the ultimate recovery. If this arrangement is
indeed a partnership under Subchapter K of the I.R.C., then the plaintiff’s
contribution of property (the cause of action) in exchange for a
partnership interest and the attorney’s contribution of services in
exchange for a partnership interest would be initially tax-free under Code
§ 721.192 At the point when the cause of action, combined with the
attorney’s services, is reduced to a cash judgment, the income would be
allocated among the partners in accordance with the partnership
agreement (i.e., the contingency fee) according to Code § 704(a).193 That
is, the attorney would be allocated her portion of the recovery for tax
purposes, and the plaintiff would not be subject to tax on the attorney’s
portion.194 The Sixth Circuit favorably referenced this view, among
others, in its holding for the taxpayer in the portion of Banks that was
ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court from that circuit.195 Hellwig
and Polsky reviewed this argument in 2004 and found that this approach
leads quickly back to Code § 83, as a transfer of property in exchange for
services similar to those approaches discussed above.196
Perhaps an even simpler analysis could dispose of this argument.
According to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (“RUPA”), a
“partnership” is “an association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit.”197 It strains reason to construe as “profit”
the award or settlement that a plaintiff and her attorney are seeking to

as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes.”).
192. Id. at 437; see also I.R.C. § 721(a) (2006) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized to a
partnership or to any of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the
partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership.”); Brief for the Respondent at 1516, Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (No.03-892).
193. Brief for the Respondent Banaitis at 5, Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (No.
03-907), 2004 WL 183536; Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 913.
194. I.R.C. § 704(a); Brief for the Respondent Banaitis, supra note 193, at 5-6.
195. Banks v. Comm’r, 345 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing to that court’s earlier
findings in Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857-58 (6th Cir. 2000)) (“[W]e
found other factors persuasive in distinguishing contingency fees from Lucas and Horst,
including . . . taxpayer’s claim was like a partnership or joint venture in which the taxpayer
assigned away one-third in hope of recovering two-thirds.”), reversed by Comm’r v. Banks,
543 U.S. 426 (2005).
196. Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 913-14.
197. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997).
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recover in a personal injury lawsuit. Even the interest component of such
an award, which is taxable, could not easily be construed as a “profit” in
any usual or legal sense of the term.198 The policy behind most postjudgment and other interest payments is to compensate the recipient for
the lost time value of the money that has been awarded.199 It is difficult to
construe as a venture for “profit” a partnership whose sole business
purpose is to recover amounts that compensate a plaintiff for a personal
injury or address a deferred economic entitlement.
Similarly, the Code defines a partnership as “a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means
of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on.”200
Again, two parties working together to recover compensatory damages
and even interest resulting from harm done to one of the parties could
hardly be construed as a business or financial operation.201 Perhaps such
an endeavor could be considered a “venture,” but not in any traditional
sense of the term. It is clear that the arrangement between a personal
injury plaintiff and her attorney under a contingency fee contract would
198. See Bradley T. Borden, Taxing Shared Economies of Scale, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 721,
755 (2009). Although Professor Borden examines the definition of “profit” in the tax
definition context, he explores the broader meaning and origins of the term:
Three potential definitions of profit exist: (1) an accounting definition, (2) a
balance sheet definition, and (3) a dictionary definition. The accounting
definition of profits is “net income, or the difference between revenues and
expenses, for a given accounting period.” . . . The balance sheet definition
refers to profits as money that remains after a partnership pays all liabilities and
returns partner contributions. . . . The dictionary definition is the “benefit or
advantage accruing from the management, use, or sale of property from the
carrying on of any process of production, or from the conduct of business.”
Id. at 755-56 (citations omitted) (quoting City of Englewood v. Commercial Union
Assurance Cos., 940 P.2d 948, 957 (Colo. App. 1996), which utilized the definition of profit
set forth in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as “[a]n advantage, benefit,
accession of good, gain, or valuable return especially in financial matters. . . . [a] benefit or
advantage accruing from the management, use, or sale of property from the carrying on of
any process of production, or from the conduct of business.”)). All of these definitions seem
to imply some sort of gain or advantage from the starting point and not merely restitution.
199. See supra Part II.A.; see, e.g., Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F.2d 752, 756 (9th
Cir. 1983) (“The purpose of awarding interest to a party recovering a money judgment is, of
course, to compensate the wronged person for being deprived of the monetary value of the
loss from the time of the loss to the payment of the money judgment.”).
200. I.R.C. § 761 (2006).
201. See generally, Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 925, 984-91 (2006) (describing the joint-profit motive required for
recognition of a tax partnership under federal law).
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not be a business or tax law partnership even from a platonic or
definitional perspective.
The partnership or joint venture approach raises some of the same
ethical considerations as the concept of an immediate transfer of a
property interest in the cause of action to the plaintiff’s attorney upon
entering into the contingent fee arrangement.202 In theory, perhaps it is
possible that one partner could retain control of the ultimate disposition
over the properties of the partnership while the other partner merely
contributes services and waits for a potential distribution of cash from the
partnership.
That view, however, represents a terribly strained
understanding of the attorney-client relationship (the typical principalagent relationship as discussed below) and presents a host of challenges to
identifying the actual parameters of the respective contributions, rights,
and duties of the “partners.”
Further, while listing Subchapter K treatment of the contingent fee
arrangement among those theories of exclusion that must be developed
further by lower courts, the Supreme Court in Banks all but foreclosed
this path elsewhere in its opinion.203 Although no intent is necessary to
create a partnership, the principal difference between the partnership or
joint venture and the attorney-client relationship is that the client
maintains ultimate control over the case at all times.204 Indeed, the
attorney-client relationship, in the words of the Court, is the
“quintessential principal-agent relationship.”205 In the Court’s view,
“[t]he attorney is an agent who is duty-bound to act only in the interests of
the principal, and so it is appropriate to treat the full amount of the
recovery as income to the principal.”206 The Court also cited Judge
Posner’s observation that “‘the contingent-fee lawyer [is not] a joint
owner of his client’s claim in the legal sense any more than the
commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer’s accounts

202. See Jackson, supra note 41, at 123; Reece, supra note 21, at 330 (“Second, attorneys
taking an ownership interest in the claim is a per se violation of the ethical rules of
professional conduct.”).
203. Jackson, supra note 41, at 119, 123.
204. Id. at 123 (“In an attorney-client relationship, the client maintains control. The
attorney may take certain steps on behalf of the client; however, the client maintains ultimate
control over the critical decisions, more like a principal-agent relationship than partners.”
(citing Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 13, 39, 387 (1957)))).
205. Banks, 543 U.S. at 436.
206. Id.
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receivable.’”207 Accordingly, “the [p]ortion paid to the agent may be
deductible, but absent some other provision of law it is not excludable
from the principal’s gross income.”208 This language leaves little doubt
that a partnership or joint venture approach is far from adoption in the
highest level of the judiciary.
2. Transaction Cost
The Banks decision also specifically declined to address a theory in
which litigation recoveries are viewed as proceeds from the disposition of
property under Code §§ 1001, 1012, and 1016.209 This approach was
advocated by Jackson in her 2005 article.210 The transactional cost
approach views the attorney’s fee as a cost incurred in the realization of
the income from the claim, which allows the individual taxpayer to pay
taxes only on what she actually realized.211 The Seventh Circuit in
Kenseth v. Commissioner212 applied a transactional-cost method.213
Jackson analogized this approach to that followed for securities vending
in Treasury Regulation § 1.263(a)-2(e), which specifically allows for the
offset of commissions against the selling price.214
According to Jackson, “[a]pplication of the transactional-cost theory
begins with the recognition that [a] client’s claim is . . . property[,]”
which has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Banks.215 The
amount realized would be offset by the basis, which would be adjusted for
the costs and expenditures connected to the claim.216 The plaintiff in this
situation would be analogous to a seller of a block of stock or parcel of
real estate. In both of these situations, the seller is allowed to offset the
proceeds with the costs incurred to produce those proceeds.217 According
to Jackson, the transactional-cost or capital-cost method would be
equitable and would ensure that the parties pay tax just on what they have

207. Id. at 436-37 (alteration in original) (quoting Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 883
(7th Cir. 2001)).
208. Id. at 437.
209. Id. at 437-38.
210. Jackson, supra note 41, at 126.
211. Id.
212. 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
213. Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883; Jackson, supra note 41, at 126.
214. Jackson, supra note 41, at 127.
215. Id. at 129.
216. Id. at 130.
217. Id. at 130-31.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

366

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:325

earned.218 Finally, she argued that the approach would work equally well
for hourly and contingency fees and suggested that application of the
transactional cost approach would make changes to § 62(a)
unnecessary.219
Although Hellwig and Polksy agreed that this approach is sound from a
policy standpoint and would produce an equitable result for the plaintiff,
they determined that “there simply exists too much established doctrine
standing in its way.”220 This position was articulated earlier in Alexander
v. IRS,221 in which the court found that the Code simply does not provide
for the offsetting of basis in cases where a litigant sues to recover his due
compensation, except in limited circumstances involving capital assets.222
Instead, the Code provides for deductions for such litigation expenses.
Accepting the transaction cost argument, according to Hellwig and
Polsky, would not only entail overturning court-made doctrine, “it would
[] require either ignoring or marginalizing Treas. Reg. Section 1.2121(k)223 . . . and would override settled expectations of those taxpayers who
pay their business-related litigation costs by the hour.”224

218. Id. at 133-34.
219. Id. at 134.
220. Hellwig & Polksy, supra note 39, at 921.
221. 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995).
222. Id. at 944.
223. “Expenses paid or incurred in defending or perfecting title to property, in recovering
property (other than investment property and amounts of income which, if and when
recovered, must be included in gross income) . . . constitute a part of the cost of the property
and are not deductible expenses.” Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(k) (as amended in 1975).
224. Hellwig & Polksy, supra note 39, at 921. The 2004 Hellwig and Polsky article
wraps up with an analysis of Section 62(a)(19) (now (a)(20)) as adopted at the time:
The need to correct the improper tax treatment of legal fees exists for all cases
that are currently subject to the AMT trap – not just those relating to unlawful
discrimination or broader claims arising in the employment context. There is
no justifiable reason why legal fees paid or incurred to prosecute claims for
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or punitive damages
should be relegated to the status of miscellaneous itemized deductions that are
subject to complete disallowance under the AMT. Accordingly, the AMT trap
should be corrected for all possible situations in which it would otherwise arise.
This could be accomplished rather easily by amending section 62(a) to add to
its list of above-the-line deductions the following: deductions allowed under
sections 162 or 212 which consist of expenses paid or incurred in connection
with the prosecution of a cause of action.
Id. at 938-39. I am essentially advocating an expansion of this solution, directed instead at
the taxable components of otherwise non-taxable awards.
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Suffice it to say that each of these approaches presents unique and
troublesome implementation issues, not the least of which is overcoming
the Supreme Court’s edict in Banks.
IV. Potential Legislative Solutions
In light of the Supreme Court’s application of the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine to the contingent fee arrangement in
Commissioner v. Banks and its refusal to adopt any of the novel attempts
to re-characterize the attorney-client relationship advocated by the
taxpayers in Banks, a legislative solution to overtaxing plaintiffs may be
the only possibility for fulfilling the policy of making injured plaintiff’s
whole.225 A statutory revision could provide the successful plaintiff in
partially non-taxable cases (e.g., personal injury and sickness cases) with
the ability to either exclude or deduct above-the-line taxable portions of
the recovery which are paid to her attorney as well as court costs.226 This
approach would eliminate any need to resort to a state-by-state analysis of
attorney lien statutes in order to determine what property interests, if any,
the attorney had in a cause of action. It would likewise foreclose the
potential for ethical questions that could be raised as a result of construing
the attorney’s lien as a property interest or anything beyond merely a
grant of preferred creditor status.227 A legislative solution would also
remove from the domain of the judiciary the responsibility for identifying
unique property rights or otherwise implementing creative theories
designed to avoid the arguably unjust result of taxing clients on their
attorney’s share of the gross recovery. Without the need to allow these
theories to work their way through the judiciary, a statutory approach
provides for immediate and consistent implementation and, most
importantly, for predictable results for litigants and their advisors.
A. Additional Deduction under Code § 212
Code § 212 provides for a deduction of expenses incurred in
The
connection with the production or collection of income.228
Regulations interpreting § 212 explain that this deduction will not be
available when the income produced is not taxable: “[N]o deduction is
225. 543 U.S. 426, 434-37 (2005).
226. Others previously have suggested or evaluated similar legislative solutions at
various times. See, e.g., Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 39, at 931-38; Jackson, supra note
41, at 133-34; Reece, supra note 21, at 338-42.
227. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
228. I.R.C. § 212(1) (2006).
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allowable under section 212 for any amount allocable to the
production . . . of income which [is] not includible in gross
income . . . .”229 Further, I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) states that “[n]o deduction
shall be allowed for . . . [a]ny amount otherwise allowable as a deduction
which is allocable to one or more classes of income . . . wholly exempt
from the taxes imposed by this subtitle . . . .”230 Accordingly, a special
provision would be required to allow for the deduction for expenses paid
(including attorney’s fees and court costs) with respect to the recovery of
non-taxable amounts. Below is a suggested revised Code § 212, which
would provide such a deduction for cases involving personal injury or
sickness (i.e., excludable under Code § 104(a)), but only to the extent that
the claim produces taxable interest or punitive damages. This limit would
prevent the deduction of attorney’s fees and costs when none of the
recovery is taxable, and therefore, the issue of overtaxing a litigant is not
in play.
Sample Revised § 212:
Section 212: Expenses for the Production of Income. In the case of
an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year —
(1) For the production or collection of income;
(2) For the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income;
(3) In connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any
tax; or
(4) For the production or collection of amounts received in any action
involving a claim whose recovery is excluded from gross income under
Section 104(a), but only to the extent that such claim results in recovery
of taxable interest.
Two simple examples demonstrate how this provision would apply:
Example A: If X is awarded $3,000,000 compensatory damages
excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a) for personal injury and $1,500,000 in
taxable interest, and X pays $2,000,000 in attorney’s fees and court costs,
X would be allowed a deduction in the amount of $1,500,000.
Example B: If X is awarded $5,000,000 compensatory non-taxable
damages and $500,000 in taxable interest and pays $200,000 to attorney
under an hourly fee arrangement, X would be allowed a $200,000
deduction.
229. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(e) (as amended in 1975).
230. I.R.C. § 265(a)(1).
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Obviously, § 265 would have to be revised to reflect any changes
allowing deductions. This could be done with a simple preface to § 265
stating “[e]xcept as provided in Section 212 . . . .”
To complete the
circle, Code § 62 would have to be revised as well to make the deduction
an above-the-line deduction, which would be available notwithstanding
the application of the AMT. This revision is almost identical to the
language added by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,231 which
provided a useable deduction for recovering plaintiffs in certain
employment and civil rights cases.
Sample Addition to § 62(a):
Section 62(a) General Rule. . . . the term “adjusted gross income”
means, in the case of an individual, gross income minus the following
deductions . . . (20) Any deduction allowable under this chapter for
attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer in
connection with any action involving a claim described in 212(4) . . . .”
Of course, even if limited, this approach does not offer a perfect
parallel for the expenses incurred to recover taxable interest or punitive
damages. In effect, it allows offsetting of taxable amounts related to nontaxable amounts to the extent that expenses are incurred, whether directly
attributable to the taxable or non-taxable recovery. Such an offset of
taxable and non-taxable amounts could potentially run afoul of generally
accepted accounting principles and could provide opportunities for abuse.
However, because a similar revision232 was previously enacted to alleviate
the problem of overtaxing recoveries in certain employment and civil
rights cases, at least some variation of the modified above-the-line
deduction for attorney’s fees and costs could be politically viable.
B. Alternative Approach: a New Exclusion
Alternatively, a different legislative approach could partially nullify the
use of the assignment of income doctrine as applied in Banks to certain
contingent fee arrangements: simply add a new exclusion for amounts
that would be includable as a result of the Banks case in otherwise nontaxable settings. This would require perhaps a new Code section, which is
drafted below as Code § 105 and is intended to address personal injury or
sickness recoveries excludable under Code § 104(a):

231. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418,
1546.
232. See supra note 76 and text accompanying note 77.
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[New] Section 105. Attorneys’ fees incurred with respect to
certain recoveries. Gross income does not include amounts
recovered, including interest, by a taxpayer in connection with
any action involving a claim the recovery of which is excluded
from gross income under I.R.C. Section 104(a), but only to the
extent of attorney’s fees or court costs paid by, or on behalf of,
a taxpayer in connection with such action.
Although neither of these legislative approaches is flawless, they do
provide a mechanism by which a successful plaintiff could avoid the
depletion of the value of her recovery that would otherwise occur because
of the application of the assignment of income doctrine to the contingent
fee arrangement. A legislative solution is attractive primarily because it
provides immediate and consistent implementation without having to
persuade the judiciary once again to address the context and content of the
attorney-client relationship in contingent fee cases. Simplicity and
predictability are particularly important in the area of taxation and our law
should reflect those goals.
C. Policy Implications of Revising the Code to Provide Relief to Plaintiffs
While advocating in favor of any additions to the Internal Revenue
Code at this point is perhaps akin to carrying coals to Newcastle, policy
does in large part support revising the Code to provide relief for plaintiffs
who have recovered partially taxable and partially non-taxable payments.
Typical review of tax policy revolves around equity and efficiency
arguments. For the equity analysis, one looks at both vertical equity,
which compares the tax burden of taxpayers of different levels of
economic well-being, as well as horizontal equity, which compares
taxpayers of the same level of economic well-being.233 In simple terms,
vertical equity is an expression of the thought that taxpayers having
different levels of economic well-being should shoulder different tax
burdens.234 That is, all other things being the same, an individual with
$100,000 of income generally should pay more taxes than an individual
with $25,000 of income.235 On the other hand, horizontal equity is an
expression of the idea that taxpayers with equal economic well-being

233. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 59-60 (4th ed. 2008).
234. Id. at 59.
235. See id.
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should face similar tax burdens.236 Accordingly, two individual taxpayers
each with $100,000 of income should pay the same amount in taxes,
everything else being equal.237 Closely related to vertical and horizontal
equity is the so-called “ability to pay” principle. The ability to pay
principle provides that a taxpayer’s tax burden should be related to that
taxpayer’s level of economic well-being.238 Under this norm, one would
consider the declining marginal utility of money to determine that an
additional dollar of tax burden on a wealthy family is less of a sacrifice
than it would be for a poor family.239
In conjunction with equity, tax policy is also concerned with the impact
of changes on the efficiency of the tax system. In this sense, an efficiency
analysis looks at whether a particular tax impacts taxpayer decisions in a
way that makes those decisions different from what they would be absent
the tax.240 An efficient tax has little or no impact on a taxpayer’s
decision-making. The concept of efficiency also touches on the
complexity of a system. To the extent tax rules become so complex that
excessive time and energy are devoted to discerning the application of the
system to a taxpayer or to enforcing the rules, the tax regime is
inefficient.241
Equity, whether couched in vertical or horizontal terms, most strongly
favors altering or amending the Code to allow plaintiffs with partially
taxable and partially non-taxable recoveries to exclude or deduct their
attorneys’ portions of the recovery from their taxable income.242 If a
major goal of a tax system is to treat similarly-situated taxpayers
similarly,243 and differently-situated taxpayers differently, then the tax
236. Id. at 60; see also Reece, supra note 21, at 335.
237. Some have expressed the sentiment that horizontal equity is not a distinct concept
from vertical equity. In other words, if the system taxes those with unequal means with
appropriate distinction, the similar tax treatment of those with equal means naturally follows.
Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48
TAX L. REV. 319, 362-63 (1993).
238. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 233, at 64.
239. Id.
240. LAURIE L. MALMAN, LINDA F. SUGIN, LEWIS D. SOLOMON, & JEROME M. HESCH, THE
INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 9 (2d ed.
2010).
241. See id. at 12.
242. See, e.g., Matthew Williams, Comment, The Taxation of Contingent Attorney’s
Fees: Is the Capitalization Theory a Viable Solution to Prevent Taxpayer Inequity?, 37 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1173 (2005).
243. See Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law
Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 565 (2010).
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regime applicable to recovering plaintiffs is a significant policy blemish.
Litigants are subject to a vast array of tax implications depending upon,
among many other things, the nature of the cause of action, the timing of
their recovery, and the structure of the settlement or award.244
As a matter of social policy and in recognition of the fact that
physically injured persons receiving compensation will not truly be
enriched economically by their litigation recoveries, Congress has
allowed such litigants to exclude personal injury recoveries from their
gross incomes.245 Other plaintiffs, like those pursuing employment
discrimination and civil rights claims in the Banks case, will be taxed on
their recoveries.246 Likewise, a plaintiff receiving a lump-sum immediate
payment will have different tax consequences from a plaintiff who accepts
a structured settlement arrangement.247 These distinctions can easily be
justified because the personal injury litigant or the lump-sum payment
litigant is in a different economic position than the employment
discrimination plaintiff and the structured settlement litigant. A plaintiff
who must spend much of her recovery on hospital bills and therapy does
not have the same economic benefit from the recovery as a plaintiff who
will not necessarily incur those same expenses. Further, a plaintiff who
has the immediate use of the entire settlement is in arguably a better
position economically than one who must receive payments over a period
of years.248
244. See generally Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 154, at 44.
245. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
Although the original legislative history is scant, it suggests that Congress
viewed compensation received for personal injuries or sickness as beyond the
reach of the income tax. One of the theories supporting the exclusion is that
personal injury awards represent a return of “human capital” and thus simply
make the victim whole by restoring him to the position he was in prior to the
tortious injury. Hence, the recipient has no taxable gain inasmuch as he is no
better off than he was prior to the injury. Another view is that the exclusion of
personal damages is grounded in compassion for the victim. . . . However, the
compassion justification has no sound theoretical foundation in tax policy.
Compassion for the victim of personal injury is not a tax reason for excluding
damages from gross income. Instead, the exclusion stems from supervening
nontax notions that tort victims should be compensated for pain and suffering
and other damages and costs arising from personal injuries or sickness,
including lost wages and punitive damages, without paying tax on the recovery.
Kovacs v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 124, 150-51 (1993) (citations omitted).
246. Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2005); see also text accompanying notes
77-81.
247. See Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 154, at 46-47.
248. However, any interest on the structured settlement would be taxable. The deferral
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Although disparate tax treatment of claims based on the nature of the
recovery and timing of the recovery are justifiable, disparate treatment of
the deductibility of their attorney’s fees and litigation costs is not so easy
to accept. Plaintiffs who utilized an attorney under a contingent fee
arrangement will have to treat the costs of recovering on their claims
differently based on the underlying cause of action at issue. It is certain
in the aftermath of Commissioner v. Banks that all plaintiffs will have to
include their attorney’s portion of the recovery in the plaintiffs’ income
even if the contingent attorney’s fee is paid directly to the attorney.249
However, pursuant to Code § 62(a)(20), added in 2004 in response to
cases similar to Banks, certain employment discrimination and civil rights
plaintiffs are allowed to deduct their attorney’s fees above-the-line, giving
them a break from the harsh tax consequences of the miscellaneous
itemized deduction characterization and consequent alternative minimum
tax liability.250 Although the plaintiff in an employment discrimination
suit will be taxed on the entire award, the above-the-line deduction for
attorney’s fees paid to recover those taxable amounts could potentially
place that plaintiff in a better economic position than a personal injury
plaintiff whose identical total dollar amount recovery consists of a nontaxable compensatory recovery as well as a sizeable interest
component.251 To achieve a horizontally equitable system of taxing these
plaintiffs, a personal injury plaintiff should be allowed to deduct her
attorney’s fees and litigation costs above-the-line, or exclude the fees and
costs, from gross income at least to the extent the recovery includes
taxable interest or punitive damages. The deduction or exclusion
advocated in this article would move us closer to a tax system that treats
similarly situated litigants similarly.
The potential trade-off from a policy perspective is on the efficiency
end. Generally speaking, plaintiffs, whether pursuing a personal injury or
employment discrimination claim, are likely to retain an attorney pursuant
to a contingent fee arrangement. The contingent fee arrangement is so
ingrained in the culture of plaintiff-side litigation, that it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which the tax consequences alter a plaintiff’s
options, much less her choice.252 Further, litigation costs are likely
of income may, however, spread the plaintiff’s tax consequences over several years,
reducing the marginal rate applicable to the recovery in any given year.
249. Banks, 543 U.S. at 430.
250. See supra Part I.A; see also supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
251. See calculations in Illustration, Part II.C.
252. See supra notes 20-22.
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outside of the plaintiff’s control, or at least expertise, in most cases. In
this respect, the tax system would not alter a plaintiff’s decision-making,
and could therefore be considered efficient.253 Nonetheless, it would be
difficult for one who has railed against the complexity of the Code in both
practice and the classroom to advocate in favor of additions to the Code
without at least acknowledging the increased complexity and concomitant
rule inefficiency such additions bring. In this case, it is clear that the
magnitude of the relief provided to plaintiffs outweighs the slight
additional complexity brought about by providing an above-the-line
deduction for attorney’s fees and litigation costs incurred by plaintiffs
with partially taxable and partially non-taxable awards or for an exclusion
to overcome the assignment of income doctrine applicable to contingent
fee arrangements. Further, such additions bring the system closer to
equity by treating taxpayers who incur similar expenses in recovering on
their claims with similar deductions or exclusions.
Conclusion
Through a series of illustrations, this article is designed to shed some
light on the dramatic and disproportionate tax consequences that face
plaintiffs who recover compensatory personal injury damages coupled
with a taxable interest component.254 In light of this tax burden on a
successful plaintiff, a burden which amplifies over time as taxable interest
accrues, it is only equitable to provide such plaintiffs with some measure
of relief that brings their tax burden closer to that of a plaintiff with a
wholly taxable employment discrimination or civil rights recovery.255 It is
becoming increasingly evident in the seven years following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Banks, that the judiciary is unlikely
to adopt any of the previously proposed solutions to the problem of
requiring a plaintiff to include her attorney’s portion of her recovery in
the plaintiff’s gross income pursuant to the anticipatory assignment of
income doctrine. Further, many of the non-legislative solutions to this
dilemma that have been advocated create significant conceptual problems
or problems in application.256

253. See MALMAN ET AL., supra note 240, at 9.
254. See supra Part II.C.
255. Cf. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat.
1418, 1546 (allowing deductions for recovering plaintiffs in certain employment and civil
rights cases).
256. See supra Part III.
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Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code should be amended to provide
an expanded deduction for the attorney’s fees and litigation costs incurred
to obtain such an award.257 To be useful, such deduction would have to be
above-the-line in order to provide a reduction from taxable income that is
not diminished by the restrictions on miscellaneous itemized deductions
and would not trigger alternative minimum tax liability. Alternatively,
the Code could be revised to allow a plaintiff to exclude from the
plaintiff’s gross income the attorney’s fee and other litigation costs paid
under a contingent fee or other arrangement that is delivered directly to
the attorney and bypasses the plaintiff’s hands altogether.258 Either of
these legislative approaches would give relief to a successful personal
injury plaintiff who also receives a taxable interest or punitive damages
recovery, and bring such a litigant more on par tax-wise with litigants
who incur attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in pursuing wholly
taxable recoveries. Further, compared to judicial approaches, legislative
solutions have the potential to provide more immediate implementation of
relief and more consistency in application. It is no longer prudent to stand
by and wait for the judiciary to adopt a new approach to viewing the
contingent fee arrangement in light of Banks’ application of the
anticipatory assignment-of-income doctrine to such contracts. Instead,
consistent with the long-standing policy of making harmed litigants
whole, real plaintiffs with real injuries need more immediate and
consistent action to provide relief from an unpalatable tax result.

257. See supra Part IV.A.
258. See supra Part IV.B.
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